Israel and Hamas: A new equation for Mid-East peace?

RSIS presents the following commentary Israel and Hamas: A new equation for  Mid-East peace? by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link.   (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the  Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 156/2011 dated 27 October 2011 Israel and Hamas: A new equation for Mid-East  peace? By James M. Dorsey Synopsis Israeli and Palestinian hardliners rather than moderates are serving each other's purpose in the Middle East conflict. That is the underlying dynamic of the political calculations of both Israel and Hamas in the recent lop-sided swap of an Israeli  soldier for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners. Commentary THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN peace process remains frozen with little, if any,  prospect of it gaining momentum. President Mahmoud Abbas' effort to achieve  United Nations recognition of Palestinian statehood in a bid to break the  logjam is mired in diplomatic red tape and likely to be foiled by a United States  veto  if  it  comes up for a vote in the Security Council. True to form, hardliners on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide are  finding common ground where moderates are grasping for straws. In doing so,  they are reaffirming a long-standing fact of life of the Israeli-Palestinian  equation: hardliners can serve each other’s needs to mutual benefit without  making the kind of wrenching concessions that thwart the ambitions of  peacemakers and moderates on both sides.  The prisoner swap in which Israel bought freedom for now Staff Sergeant  Gilad Shalit after five years in Palestinian captivity in exchange for the release  of 1,027 prisoners - many of whom were responsible for deadly attacks on  Israelis - is the latest example of sworn enemies finding it easier to do business  than those who advocate compromise and living in peace and harmony side by  side. No peace works for all Underlying, the swap is a belief on the part of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu  and Hamas that there is no realistic chance for an agreement on peace terms  that would be acceptable to both Palestinians and Israelis. Given the nature of  his coalition government, Netanyahu has so far been unwilling or unable to give  Abbas the bare minimum he would need to push forward with peace without at least  the tacit backing of Hamas. While Netanyahu officially refuses to negotiate with Hamas, for its part, Hamas  refuses Israeli conditions for its inclusion in a peace process. These are  that it recognises Israel's right to exist, abandons its armed struggle and accepts  past Israeli-Palestinian agreements. If anything, the fact that it has achieved a tangible victory with the release of prisoners belonging to both Hamas as  well as Abbas'  Fatah movement has reinforced the Islamist movement’s  conviction that its hard line is paying off. Netanyahu has strengthened Hamas in its conviction not only by excluding  Abbas from the prisoner swap. He has also done so by undermining the  Palestinian president with his decision to build a new Jewish settlement  on the southern edge of Jerusalem and granting legal status to settlements  established without his government’s approval. Abbas has made an Israeli  freeze on settlements his core pre-condition for revival of peace talks with  the Israelis, to no avail. Temporary arrangements suit all but Abbas Unlike Abbas, Netanyahu has made his most hardline critics part of  his coalition.  Netanyahu and Israel’s right-wing moreover agree on  fundamentals: a rejection of an Israeli return to the borders prior to the  1967 conquest of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem and a  perception of a nuclear-armed Iran as the foremost threat to the existence  of the Jewish state. Hamas rather than Abbas offers Netanyahu the  space to build Israeli policy on those two principles. Hamas’ refusal to  meet Israeli conditions for peace negotiations proves the Israeli  prime minister’s assertion that Israel has no Palestinian partner with  which it can do business. At the same time, Hamas has proven that it can and will  make temporary arrangements with Israel like the prisoner swap or a   ceasefire that safeguards Israeli towns from Palestinian rocket attacks.   Hamas has moreover, contributed its bit to weakening Abbas by effectively  thwarting the Palestinian leader’s efforts at reconciliation so that  Palestinians can confront Israel with a unified front. The possibility of Hamas’ external wing moving its headquarters from  Syria, Iran’s closest ally in the Arab world, to post-Mubarak Egypt, which  facilitated the prisoner swap, further serves Netanyahu’s purpose of clearing  the deck for possible pre-emptive military action against Iran. Lingering  in the background is uncertainty of what Israel’s immediate neighbourhood  may look like. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is battling for his survival  with no sign of the eight months of mass anti-government protests subsiding  despite a brutal crackdown. Jordan’s King Abdullah has so far been able to  contain demands for political reform and greater economic opportunity. Israeli military: the joker in the pack Ironically, Israel’s military and  former senior Israeli military commanders  constitute the greatest threat to  Netanyahu’s policy designs and may offer  Hamas its best chance yet of becoming a player in peace talks with Israel  as well as the dominant force in Palestinian politics. While Israel’s military  appears split on the prospect of a pre-emptive strike against Iran, at least  half of the retired leaders of Israel’s military and intelligence services have  publicly rejected  Netanyahu’s strategic thinking. Perhaps, most vocal among them is Meir Dagan, a former head of Mossad,  who has not only criticised Netanyahu’s hard line toward Iran but also called  for Israeli acceptance of a nine-year old Saudi peace plan endorsed by all Arab  states. That peace plan offers Israel full diplomatic relations in exchange for a  complete withdrawal from Palestinian lands occupied in 1967. No doubt Dagan, Hamas’ nemesis who is credited with the death of hundreds  of its operatives, has political ambitions as well as the military credentials  that Netanyahu lacks. His willingness to entertain the Saudi proposal would  open the door to Hamas to take its seat at the table. That could well lead  to a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations. James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of  International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He has  been a journalist covering the Middle East for over 30 years. Click here for past commentaries. 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