Monday, July 22, 2013

The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt



RSIS presents the following commentary The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt by James 
M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly
forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  


No. 136/2013 dated 22 July 2013

The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt

By James M. Dorsey

Synopsis

The military overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi has presented the Obama
administration with a dilemma. While the US saw its tacit backing for the Saudi-backed
military intervention as a way of steering Egypt towards a more consensual transition to
democracy, the military viewed its toppling of Morsi as an opportunity to deal a body
blow to the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently the US has become the bogeyman of
both the revolutionary youth movement and the Brothers.

Commentary

THE SAUDI-supported military overthrow of Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi on 3
July 2013 following massive demonstrations against him throughout Cairo and Egypt
presented the United States with a dilemma. The Obama administration was hard-pressed
to deflect the perception of US’ tacit support for the coup while calling for an inclusive
electoral process that would enable the Muslim Brotherhood to contest again for
parliamentary and presidential seats which they had been elected to before.

The US refusal to call the ouster of Morsi  a coup, combined with its long-standing financial
assistance to various pro-democracy groups, was perceived as proof that the US backed
efforts to create an illiberal democracy in Egypt.

Between democracy and stability

Such an outcome would prevent the return to power of Islamists who would challenge
the military’s efforts to contain the wave of change sweeping across the Middle East and
North Africa. Such a nuanced US message is hard to convey in a zero-sum environment
where anti-Morsi forces see the Morsi government as not inclusive while the Muslim
Brotherhood view Morsi’s overthrow as illegal.

The US reaction to the Egypt coup shows that its policy hinges on two ideas: democracy
and stability, which constitutes the dilemma. As a result this perpetually causes it
problems in the region. Moreover it has limited options because the Saudis are countering
the efforts of any potential cut-off of  US aid  while what constitutes US power has changed.
A small but significant sign of this change is that both the Brotherhood and the Tamarud
(Rebel) youth movement that had petitioned Morsi’s resignation refused to meet the US
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns when he visited Cairo last week; he could only
meet the military leaders.

The US parted ways with Saudi Arabia on Egypt when the military coupled its toppling of
Morsi with a crackdown on the Brotherhood, with mass arrests, legal proceedings, targeting
of Brotherhood-affiliated businesses and closure of Islamist media. The US tacitly agreed to
the removal of Morsi but not a witchhunt against the Brotherhood which will lead to an
illiberal democracy at best, and further volatility rather than a way out of the crisis.

The mass protest by the Brotherhood as well as its resolve to fight the coup and what it
sees as the illegal ouster of Morsi in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities
demonstrates that it may be down but it is certainly not out. The crackdown as well as the
nature of the military-approved roadmap for Egypt’s return to an elected government
guarantees that the country will be at best a guided democracy - restricted or controlled
behind-the-scenes by the military.

Ignore the economy at your peril

The Obama administration’s message is further called into question by the fact that its
support for pro-democracy groups included aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
that served as fronts for anti-Morsi politicians and even a former US-based police officer
who advocated violence. The US position is likely to be complicated as the broad anti-Morsi
coalition -- whose left-wing, liberal, Salafi, pro-ancien regime and youth wings agree on
little else besides Morsi’s downfall -- inevitably falls apart.

With the exception of the supporters of former autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, who was toppled
by a popular revolt in March 2011, few members of the coalition are likely to be happy with a government that may well  roll back hard-fought freedoms acquired two years ago.

Initial indications from the interim government suggest a return to Mubarak-era economics
that sparked the uprising in the first place. Anti-Morsi forces have failed to heed a key lesson
from Morsi’s failure: ignore the economy at your peril. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Kuwait – Gulf states hostile to the Brotherhood – have thrown the military and the
government a life line with US$12 billion in immediate aid. This has allowed it to entertain
rejecting, like its predecessor, a US$4.8 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that
would have forced it to introduce the unpopular reforms needed to tackle the economy’s
structural problems.

A no-win situation

The US’ dilemma is indicative of the contradiction between the Obama administration’s
rhetoric and its policy as well as its struggle to balance lofty ideals -- promotion of democracy
and human rights -- with perceived short-term interests. Wholehearted support for change in
the Middle East and North Africa would put the US at odds with almost all its Arab allies that
are governed by repressive, autocratic leaders and could endanger continued Egyptian
adherence to the peace treaty with Israel.

The contradictions mean that the US in effect responds to developments on the ground on a
case-by-case basis. By definition, that ambiguity makes it a target against the backdrop of a
policy that for decades saw autocrats as guarantors of stability at the expense of increasingly disenfranchised and discontented populace seeking social justice and greater freedom.

US options in Egypt are limited. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to compensate Egypt should
the US cut off its US$1.5 billion in primarily military aid.  Moreover, US power is globally
reduced by the fact that the world has changed. It no longer deals primarily with dependent,
poor nations playing both ends of the cold war. These countries have become largely
middle-income nations, and have alternative options in a multi-polar world. As a result the US
faces a no-win situation in Egypt.



James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of
the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, 



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Friday, July 19, 2013

Ed O'Bannon adds Six Current Football Players; Why no Basketball Players?

Ed O'Bannon has added six current football players as named plaintiffs to his lawsuit against the NCAA, EA and CLC. 

Why no current basketball players?  I explore in a new article for SI.com.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Football: a sporting barometer of European integration policies (ICSS Journal)


James M Dorsey reports on the successes that football teams have had in helping immigrant communities to integrate with wider society, observing that football can be a useful indicator of how well integration policies are working across Europe
The phones ring continuously at Kurdish football club Dalkurd FF, a hot team for agents and players. In 2009, it signed Bosnian international Nedim Halilovic and upcoming Algerian-Swedish star Nadir Benchenaa. More prominent signings are in the works. Started in 2004 with the support of top Swedish football club IK Brage as a project to create jobs for Kurdish youth, Dalkurd’s meteoric rise has put it on the international football map and turned it into a model of how a Middle Eastern immigrant community can address its social and economic problems and project its identity.
Dalkurd, one of three Swedish clubs that have fielded Europe’s most successful immigrant teams, was founded in Borlänge, a small iron and paper mill workers’ town of some 50,000 predominantly ethnically Swedish residents 220 km north of Stockholm. The club was initially launched as a project to create jobs for the youth. Dalkurd’s Swedish identity is clearly identifiable on maps; its minority Kurdish identity is not. That makes Dalkurd as much a product of the social and economic challenges facing immigrants in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe as it is of the carve-up of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century that turned Kurds into the largest nation without a homeland, and scattered them across the Middle East and the globe. It also highlights Sweden’s relative success in integrating minorities from southern Europe and North Africa who in the 1960s and 70s began immigrating to western and northern Europe, which at the time were encouraging labour migration.
Dalkurd, like other immigrant teams and players, turns football into a prism through which to view how Europe is being shaped by significant Muslim migration and uses the game as a barometer of successes and failures in integration policy. It also spotlights football’s ability to encourage bonding and the development of separate, often multi-layered, identities that help groups to find a common ground and also to differentiate themselves from one another. 
National teams, international squads
On a continental scale, a third of all goals in major European competitions in recent years were scored by either foreign-born players or those from immigrant families. These footballers account for almost half of the players in the continent’s national teams. Of the 2,600 professional players in the five top European leagues – England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France – 800 are expatriates born and recruited in an often Muslim country, and another 500 are immigrants or their descendants.
The three Swedish teams formed by Kurds or Assyrians/Syriacs – two groups that faced off with each other in the early 20th century in rugged eastern Turkey – thrive in a country that is the most welcoming in Europe to non-EU immigrants. Sweden stands out at a time of economic crisis as a nation that has been able to maintain a welfare state and pay for it too.As a result, Sweden hosts more than 25 Assyrian/Syriac clubs alone2 as well as a score of less-prominent Kurdish ones.

Dalkurd’s initial players were Kurdish migrants and refugees, and their descendants. Kurdish immigrants moved to Europe in search of more fertile economic pastures and to escape the suppression of their cultural identity and political rights in Turkey. Elvan Cicen, Dalkurd’s co-founder and sports director, says that, instinctively, the founders thought of naming the club Kurdistan, but on reflection opted for Dalkurd: Dal for Dalarna, the region where Borlänge is located, and Kurd for Kurdistan.3 Dalarna’s famous wooden horses frame the yellow sun on the red, white and green Kurdish flag that the club adopted as its own

“We are both Kurdish and Swedish. Football is our tool to integrate people. We took kids off the streets and away from the gangs. Everybody blamed the kids. But the real problem was the parents, who often were analphabets. The kids lived in different worlds in school and at home. The parents didn’t see what was happening and the kids weren’t integrated. We started involving the parents,” Cicen says.4 Dalkurd players have become role models in local high schools. They have sparked a cultural revolution, inspiring girls to form their own team with the support of Dalkurd managers who seek to overcome the objections put forward by conservative parents.

Dalkurd’s leadership, much like that of other immigrant communities, draws a distinction between integration and assimilation. “Integration is not assimilation. It’s learning a new culture without losing one’s own. Even if we had Kurdistan, I wouldn’t move there. Sure, my parents didn’t come here to be Swedes. They socialise only with the Kurdish part of Dalkurd. I’m trying to learn from both cultures. Having two cultures is being richer. We would lose if we were only a Kurdish team. They call us the Kurdish national team. That is not a problem but we don’t close the door to other people,” Cicen says.
Cicen’s philosophy is backed up by research that shows that sport serves as an integrative tool, or in the words of sports anthropologist Paul Verweel, an enabler of social participation5 through clubs that have an open culture and ideology6 with football being a sport more obsessed with ethnicity than many others.7 That open culture is further encouraged by the fact that both Dalkurd and the Assyrian teams appeal to a fan base that is not purely local but includes a regional, and even global, diaspora. Their self-image as teams that represent a nation rather than just a local community means they are rooted both in the municipality that hosts them and a more geographically diverse community. The internet allows them to maintain bonds across boundaries by broadcasting their matches live on the web and including far-away supporters in their fan networks.

For Kurds, the dream of nationhood is a more realistic one than it is for Assyrians. While Assyrians acknowledge that their hopes for a home state are likely to remain a dream, Kurds can point to an Iraqi Kurdistan as a state-in-waiting with all the building blocks in place. Tumultuous events in Syria are likely to result in Kurds gaining more rights and the government in Turkey has been willing to negotiate with guerrillas who fought a war over almost two decades in which at least 40,000 people died. Nonetheless, Dalkurd is making its mark not in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran, Turkey or Syria, but in Sweden, where it has won league after league as a Swedish team with a dual identity. Half of its players are the sons and daughters of parents who sought relief from economic under-development and suppression; the remainder are Swedes and other foreigners. Even so, its fans largely include refugees, and their Swedish-born descendants, who fled religious and ethnic discrimination in Turkey and Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s ethnic cleansing of Kurds in northern Iraq. Dalkurd’s sponsors are predominantly Swedish-Kurdish businessmen. 
Kurdish members of Dalkurd’s board do not hide their empathy for the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the guerrilla group that fought Turkish security forces in south-eastern Turkey. The PKK has, in recent years, dropped its demand for an independent Kurdish state in favour of full cultural and political rights within the framework of the Turkish state. Officials in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the PKK has bases, suggest that the group has helped fund Dalkurd, a claim the club’s executives deny. Nevertheless, Dalkurd chairman Ramazan Kizil, a Kurdish immigrant from Turkey, was sentenced in 2010 in absentia to 10 months in prison in his homeland after giving a speech in his native Kurdish and campaigning on behalf of a pro-Kurdish political party. Kizil’s ambition is to take Dalkurd into the UEFA Europa League, where he dreams of unfurling the Kurdish alongside the Swedish flag. Iraqi Kurdistan has long campaigned unsuccessfully to become a member of FIFA with a status like that of Palestine, the only member without a country, or England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, all of which compete separately rather than as the United Kingdom.
The VIVA World Cup
In doing so, he would put a dent in Kurdistan’s status as a football outcast. Kurdish players are international stars and Kurdish clubs dominate the Iraqi league, but the Kurdish flag flies only at the VIVA World Cup, a tournament that operates by a different set of standards to those of FIFA. VIVA competitors are teams that hail from a tribal area, an agricultural province, an occupied nation, a semi-autonomous region, an ancient city-state, a disenfranchised minority enclave or a nation that is not recognised by football’s international governing body. “The goal is ideological,” says Jean-Luc Kit, vice president of the New Federation Board, VIVA’s organiser. “It’s about allowing peoples to exist through sport.”
8 In VIVA, Iraqi Kurds, who are the closest to statehood than Kurds have ever come, and hosted the VIVA tournament in 2012, join fellow aspirant nations, such as Provence, the former Roman province of Raetia in Switzerland, Occitania, the Western Sahara, Darfur, Northern Cyprus, Zanzibar and Greenland – a country that FIFA does not recognise in part because it is too cold to grow adequate grass there.

The goal of integration
If Dalkurd advances into the UEFA Europa League, the club would also achieve another goal: it would symbolise Kurdish integration into Sweden in much the same way that the country’s two other top performing immigrant teams from the industrial town of Södertälje, 35 km south of Stockholm, did for the Assyrian/Syriac community. Ironically, the split among Assyrians in Södertälje, where they account for a quarter of the population, over how to refer to their community in Swedish – depending on whether one emphasises religion and church or the ancient national characteristics of the group – reflects the degree to which they have integrated into their adopted homeland. Assyrians, unlike Kurds, immigrated to Sweden in the knowledge that they were unlikely to ever witness the resurrection of their homeland as a national entity. “We were born here. We don’t know exactly what happened over there. Sweden is good. It is our country. We have no other country. I would never want to live in Turkey. I go there on vacation and come back. Turkey is not for our people. When we play there, they stamp our passports at the border and throw them at us. They don’t like us,” said Syriac football player Robert Massi.
The split within the community has sparked two rival football teams. Each sees itself as the national squad of a disenfranchised nation. There are also two satellite television stations that broadcast in multiple languages, two churches, and a playground for criminal and foreign interests. The differing interpretations of history and identity are highlighted in symbols and chants during Södertälje’s derby.9 Assyriska FF fans boast tattoos of the Assyrian god Ashur while those of Syrianska FC display Christian symbolism or Syriac script on their bare upper bodies. Assyriska fans rolled out a huge flag portraying a medieval patriarch with a sword in commemoration of the mass killing of Assyrians in 1915 and an image of the Ishtar Gate in ancient Babel during the 2009 derby.10 Similarly, fans of both clubs often lace their debates about their teams with historic and religious references designed to prove their differing perceptions on whether the Assyrian kingdom will ever be resurrected and to what degree Assyrians can be distinguished from their church. The differing expressions of support constitute a continuous negotiation of what it means to be an Assyrian or Syriac.11 

The football pitch serves as their platform for becoming part of a new society while at the same time maintaining past cultural identity and resisting efforts to marginalise their national and religious roots. As such, the battles on the pitch are an extension of issues Assyrians and Syriacs confront in their daily lives.
If history and cultural tradition defines the Assyrian/Syriac and Kurdish communities in Södertälje and Borlänge, so does concern about the blood-drenched popular revolt in Syria, intermittent clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK in predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey, and the spectre of the two meshing with Kurds becoming pawns in the struggle for the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime. Those fears are reinforced by: the influx of Christian refugees from Iraq and, more recently, Syria; concerns about the rise of Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, Syria and post-revolt Middle Eastern and North African nations; links between some Assyrians and Israel; and the grip of pro-Assad elements on the institutions of one significant faction of Assyrians. 
The decision of Ignatius IV Hazim, the late patriarch of Antioch, to back Assad12 highlighted the split in the community and raised concerns that the community might be seen in Sweden as supportive of the Syrian leader’s brutal regime. Football managers fear that such an image could undermine their efforts to project themselves as symbols of integration in a country traditionally sympathetic to their community, which migrated to stay and constitutes an economic success story. The community has produced one former minister and a number of well-known journalists. Yet Assyrians and Syriacs, like the Kurds, feel that no matter how integrated they are and how good their Swedish is they continue to be viewed as outsiders by Swedish society. “I have been here for 40 years but I am still a foreigner. They never make you feel a part of their country. I did my military service here, I play golf and I speak Swedish. But because of my name and hair colour, they treat me differently. I’m still thankful,” says Assyriska executive Aziz Jacob.13 

The perception that there is support for Assad from a significant segment of the community strengthens Swedish suspicions of links between the clubs and organised crime. These were reinforced by the recent trial of 17 people, including two Syrian nationals, on murder, blackmail and other charges involving Assyrian football in Södertälje.14 The fears are most prevalent among officials and supporters of Syrianska FC, the team aligned with the church of Ignatius IV Hazim. Ghayath Moro, a former Syrianska board member who now serves as the unelected head of security, fled Syria in the 1970s and arrived in Sweden aboard a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) flight from Lebanon. Moro’s unelected position of power in Syrianska serves as evidence for its Assyriska rivals that theirs is a more forward-looking, professionally run club in which officials are held accountable. To Assyriska officials and supporters, professionalism is a code word for ‘better integrated’ in Sweden. Assyriska officials note that their meetings are conducted in Swedish while those of Syrianska are in Aramaic. Swedish football association officials point out that Syrianska is managed by a small core group that has full control while Assyriska has a more professionally constituted board.15 In many ways, the split in the community that has been formalised in rival football teams has become one about the nature and degree of integration, with football as a manifestation of differing perceptions of history and culture. The differing perceptions are also reflected in the Syrian Orthodox Church’s close-knit ties with Syrianska, which are viewed by Assyriska supporters as a dangerous mingling of national and cultural identity.

Lulu Shanku, a Syrianska star who in 2011 stopped playing for the Syrian national team, freely describes the corruption in Syrian football and the intimidation of players by the Assad regime – until Moro joins the conversation. Replying to a question posed to Shanku about the fate of Mosab Balhous, the Syrian national team’s goalkeeper who initially vanished two years ago after reportedly being accused by the Assad regime of being an Islamist, Moro says: “Mosab disappeared because of one of the gangsters against the regime.” According to a senior Syrian football official, now a refugee in Jordan, Balhous resurfaced in Syria in 2013, though he could not explain his two-year disappearance. 
Using terminology employed by the regime, Moro denounces Syrian protesters and rebels as “gangsters” and accuses the United States, Israel and Al Qaeda of waging war against Assad. “It is clear that the people want Assad,” Moro says. “The gangsters bombed our church in Khaldiye [an embattled neighbourhood of the city of Homs where Balhous originates and where another national goalkeeper is an opposition leader]. Too many Christians died. Christians are 10 per cent of the population. We have two ministers [in Syria]. Christians and Syrians have always lived in peace and had good relations.” He says the siege of Homs has, since the bombing, enabled Assad to “clean” the city. 
Younger Assyrians and Syriacs raised in Sweden, with its long history of social democratic government, feel uneasy with Moro’s unabashed support for a regime whose ruthlessness has made it a pariah. They too, however, express concerns about the fate of the Christian minority in a post-Assad era. They feel more comfortable with Moro’s expression of frustration with a perceived lack of acceptance by Swedish society. “The Swedes don’t want us to succeed. We’re ambitious, that is what sets us apart. We try all the time to build bridges. It is not easy because we are a foreign team and always will be a foreign team. They don’t see us as Swedes… and the Swedish media do not show our good side,” Moro says, referring to reports on Södertälje football’s links to criminal groups. Describing Syrianiska as a tool to keep youth from drifting into alcohol and drug abuse, Moro blames the city’s criminality on high unemployment and an influx of refugees from Iraq, many of whom are unregistered. He says an increase in police officers had made streets safe again.
The perception that society is failing to embrace the descendents of immigrants as equals is even stronger on German football pitches. Take the case of Nuri Sahin, for example. He was heralded a future star at age 16. He was the youngest player ever to compete in Germany’s Bundesliga, the country’s premier league. A German-born Turk with an infatuating smile, Sahin had secured his place in Germany’s national football team. The German Football Association did everything to persuade him to grab the opportunity, but to no avail. Sahin, like many top German-Turkish footballers, was determined to play for Turkey, asserting that he may have been born in Germany but that at the bottom line he was Turkish.16 In his first international game, he scored the winning goal – against Germany. 

Sahin’s refusal to play for Germany is the product of a country that until recently refused to give citizenship even to those children of immigrants that were born in Germany. Yet, it shocked Germans, who see their national football team as proof that they are successfully integrating their seven million immigrants. With German spoken almost as much in Istanbul clubs as it is in German clubs, Sahin’s decision and the talent drain it represents are a loss and a tell-tale sign of Germany’s struggle with the integration of immigrants.
At the same time, it also tells the story of football’s cross-fertilising effect, not only in Europe but beyond the continent’s borders. The German Turks bring German virtues to Turkey and badly needed talent to European clubs. Football further bridges identities and constitutes a sort of reverse reconciliation, as is the case with France, whose French-born players join teams of their parents’ heritage in Algeria and elsewhere across the Mediterranean. 

The cross-fertilisation effect
The cross fertilisation goes a step further. The ultras – militant, highly organised, highly politicised, street-battle hardened football fans in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa – trace their roots and model themselves on similar groups in Italy and Serbia. It was a German-Tunisian football player, Sami Khedira, who sparked the first crisis in post-revolt Tunisia between the media and the Islamist Ennahda-led government. Staff at Attounissia newspaper were arrested in February 2013 for reprinting a revealing cover of GQ Magazine on which Khedira, dressed in a tuxedo, covers with his hands the breasts of his otherwise naked girlfriend, German model Lena Gercke. 
If Germany’s struggle with immigration is a story of two steps forward, one step back, across the Rhine in France, home to western Europe’s largest Muslim community, it’s one step forward, two steps back. Germans feted their 2010 multi-cultural World Cup squad as proof of the new Germany, a country where integration of Muslim immigrants is succeeding even if it remains cumbersome 10 years after offering, for the first time, citizenship to the German-born offspring of migrants. Germany’s success, moreover, loomed large against the backdrop of the disintegration in South Africa of the French national squad, a damming condemnation of France’s integration policy.
In fact, when the jet carrying the disgraced French team home landed on the tarmac in Paris it resembled an aircraft being sequestered for security or safety reasons. The plane stood there for an hour with its doors closed as the French media, government ministers and politicians denounced the football team as scum, trouble-makers and ‘guys with peas in their heads instead of brains,’ who were led by a captain who refused to sing the Marseillaise. The team made the kind of football history that Frenchmen would prefer to forget about: they were the first team ever to go on strike during a World Cup tournament and turned France into a global laughing stock. 
Right wingers compared the players, many of whom hailed from immigrant suburbs, to hooded youths who set fire to cars on Saturday nights. Centre-right ministers echoed far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen’s denunciation of the team before the World Cup. She said the squad did not represent France and were more interested in commercial endorsements than national pride. Her comments came in response to Zinedine Zidane, the French-born scion of Algerian immigrants. Zidane is married to a Spaniard whose children have Christian names, and who is widely viewed as one of the best players of his generation. He describes himself as “first a Kabyle [Berber] from La Castellane [a neighborhood of Marseille], then an Algerian from Marseille, and then a Frenchman”.
This was all a far cry from the days of glory in 1998, when a victorious black-white-Arab team united the country. The question is: what went wrong? The answer to some degree is former French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s focus on money and individualism that reinforced social and urban segregation, hardened the religious and cultural divide and fed post-9/11 prejudice against Muslims. Yet football was an indicator of the disintegration that predated Sarkozy and led to the World Cup disgrace. 

The hijab as a cultural symbol
By the same token, Denmark, a country that in recent years has adopted a tougher stance on immigration, emerged as an unlikely catalyst in the acceptance of women who choose to wear the hijab on the football pitch. In 2008 the Danish Football Association backed Zainab al Khatib, a 15-year-old star striker of Palestinian origin who carried the banner in Europe for women demanding the right to play with their heads covered. Its support inspired a campaign to portray the headdress as a cultural rather than a religious symbol. That distinction ultimately persuaded the International Football Association Board, the body that governs the rules of professional football, to rule in 2012 that religiously observant women could wear a headdress that meets their cultural requirements, as well as standards of safety and security. The Danish support for Al Khatib was remarkable as it came at a time that parliaments in France, Belgium and Spain were imposing restrictions on Muslim women’s garb. 
Khatib became the first covered national football player in Europe to be successfully fielded by her team. She wears a black scarf tightly wrapped around her head when she unleashes her lightning fast and nimble skills, and extraordinary her ability to score with a header. The Danish association defended the headscarf of its Under-18 national team’s most promising forward as a cultural rather than a religious commitment and compared it to the headband of Brazilian midfielder Ronaldinho Gaucho, which also violates FIFA’s insistence that all players should be dressed identically. 
The Danish association’s support of Al Khatib set an example for the coalition of female European and Asian football executives and trainers, and Middle Eastern women players led by FIFA vice president Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein of Jordan, which successfully campaigned for FIFA and IFAB’s lifting of the ban on women’s headdress. 
The football pitch has become an important tool for integration and a measure of the success of European integration policies. As such, it constitutes a barometer that local, regional and national policymakers in Europe cannot afford to ignore.
James M Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, Co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog

  1. Anne Jolis, The Swedish Model for Europe, The Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2012 
  2. Swedish Football Association quoted by Carl Rommel, Real Play, Suryoyo identification in Sweden Through the Performative Space of Football, unpublished MA thesis, 15 September 2009, page 25
  3. Interview with Dalkurd Co-founder and Sports Director Elvan Cicen on 12 May 2012
  4. Idem
  5. Paul Verweel, Respect in en Door Sport, Uitgeverij SWP, Amsterdam, 2007, page 30
  6. M Douglas, Essays with Sociology of Perception, Routledge, London, 1982
  7. Verweel, idem, page 19
  8. Interview with the author on 1 June 2012
  9. Carl Rommel, Real Play, Suryoyo identification in Sweden Through the Performative Space of Football, unpublished MA thesis, 15 September 2009
  10. idem
  11. Carl Rommel, Playing with difference: football as a performative space for division among Suryoye migrants in Sweden, Soccer & Society, 2011, page 850, 12:6
  12. David Gardner, Middle East: Febrile and Fragmented, Financial Times19 May, 2012
  13. Interview with the author on 12 May, 2012
  14. 17 Charged in Footballer’s ‘Gang-war’ Slaying, The Local, 16 November 2011
  15. Interview with the author on May 16 2011
  16. Markus Flohr and Maximilian Popp, Turkey Recruits Players ‘Made in Germany’, Der Spiegel, 17 September 2010

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Let them wear towels

Last night, ESPN premiered Let Them Wear Towels, the third in its Nine for IX documentary series (nine films, all by female directors, marking the 40th anniversary of Title IX). Directed by Annie Sundberg and Ricki Stern, the film examines the experiences of the first generation of female sportswriters and their efforts to get equal access to lockerrooms. This one has a lot of law to it. For one thing, many of the early women sportswriters got those jobs because many of the major news outlets (including The New York Times, Washington Post, and Newsday) had been sued for employment discrimination and were looking to hire female sportswriters. The film also discusses Melissa Ludtke's successful 1978 lawsuit challenging Major League Baseball's exclusion of women from clubhouses as applied to Yankee Stadium,* which somewhat started the slow move toward league-wide policies in all four major sports.
    * The district court found that MLB and the Yankees acted under color of law, because New York City owned the old Yankee Stadium. This decision is a big part of my arguments about the First Amendment rights of fans at publicly financed ballparks.
The film closes with the story of Lisa Olson, who in 1990 was sexually harassed by several players in the New England Patriots lockerroom, then suffered public harassment and vilification that pushed her to move out of the country for six years. The film's presentation of the Olson case illustrates something about the evolution of social movements. The early cohort of women reporters, who are the main subjects of the film, talk about turning a blind eye and deaf ear to offensive behavior. For them and their period of the mid-'70s to mid-'80s, the goal was simply access and getting inside the lockerroom so they could do their jobs; lewd comments and actions were the cost of that access. Olson's story is the second wave of the movement--having been granted access (a given by 1990), the demand was for a certain minimum level of behavior and treatment when they were there.

The one other thing I would have liked to have seen was some update on the views of the men who strongly opposed women's access back in the day--do they still hold to what they said 30 years ago or are they embarassed by it? Several of them are dead (former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, former Patriots owner Robert Kraft Victor Kiam, whose public comments exacerbated the Olson situation). ESPN does have a short companion film in which journalists and athletes of that era talk about the past and come across as largely supportive.

The Struggle for Egypt: Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role



RSIS presents the following commentary The Struggle for Egypt: Saudi Arabia’s
Regional Role by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print
it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg


No. 130/2013 dated 16 July 2013

The Struggle for Egypt:
Saudi Arabia’s Regional Role

By James M. Dorsey

Synopsis

Recent events in Egypt and Syria suggest a concerted Saudi effort to contain the
wave of calls for change across the Middle East and North Africa. The move has
led to the rise of Saudi allies in Egypt and Syria and the adoption of procedures
that favour the kingdom and put the Muslim Brotherhood’s main foreign backer,
Qatar, under its new emir, on the defensive.

Commentary

WHEN EGYPT’s military chief General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi declared last week
that President Mohammed Morsi had been deposed, standing next to him were
leaders of the Saudi-backed Salafist Nour Party. This endorsement signalled Saudi
support for the coup and gave the military the fig leaf it needed to assert that its
intervention was against the Brotherhood rather than the rise of political Islam.

The Salafists’ key role in doing the bidding of the Saudis was reinforced by their
successful rejection of liberal opposition politician Mohammed el-Baradei as prime
minister and the military’s pledge to retain all references to Islamic law in the
constitution. The Egyptian military coup was Saudi Arabia’s third successful
counter-strike in recent weeks against the wave of change in the Middle East and
North Africa and its most important defeat to date of Qatari support for popular
revolts and the Brotherhood.

Saudi’s wider regional role
The role of the Salafists was coupled with a Saudi effort to counter Qatar’s financial
backing by withdrawing its comparatively limited financial support for the Morsi
government and pledging to shield the Egyptian military from any international
financial fallout from its intervention, including a possible US cut in military aid.

As the anti-Morsi protests erupted in Egypt, the Qatari-backed Syrian National
Council (SNC) Prime Minister-in-exile Ghassan Hitto resigned under Saudi pressure
and Saudi-backed Ahmed Assi Al-Jerba defeated his Qatar-supported rival, Adib
Shishakly, in the SNC presidential elections. Earlier, Saudi Arabia succeeded in
restricting Qatari support for the Brotherhood within the SNC and the Free Syrian
Army as well as for more radical Islamists.

It did so by securing approval by the Obama administration to supply non-US
surface-to-air missiles to Syrian rebels. US consent was on the condition that
distribution of the missiles was handled by the rebel Supreme Military Council to
ensure that weapons did not flow to jihadist forces. Qatar is likely to have little
choice but to follow suit.

Qatar’s activist foreign policy

The Qatari setbacks raise the question of whether the Gulf state, seeking to carve
out an identity and place of its own in the shadow of Saudi Arabia - the Gulf’s
dominant power - will be able to sustain its activist support of popular revolts and
endorsement of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa. They also call
into question Qatar’s ability, in opposition to Saudi Arabia, to continuously support
change in the region as long as it does not occur in its own backyard.

To be sure, it is too early to suggest that Qatar’s new emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad
al-Thani, who last month took over the reins as ruler from his father, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa al-Thani, will adopt a policy more in line with Saudi Arabia and  other
Gulf states. There are however hints of change.

Host to the largest US military base in the Middle East, Qatar, like Saudi Arabia
congratulated the Egyptian military for its ousting of Morsi. But unlike Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates who remained silent after the killing last week of 54
Morsi supporters and extended Egypt US$3 billion in grants and loans, Qatar
expressed regret at the incident and urged self-restraint and dialogue.

Qatar’s expression of regret was nonetheless significantly different from the tone
that Sheikh Tamim adopted in his first speech after taking office. Tamim pledged in
his inaugural address that Qatar would continue to side with the “aspirations (of the
people) to live in freedom and dignity, away from corruption and tyranny” and that
his country would “remain the Kaaba (Islam’s holiest shrine in Mecca) of the
oppressed.”
 
Despite the setbacks and the downfall of Morsi, Qatar is however unlikely to break
its ties with the Brotherhood. Qatar’s relationship with the group is longstanding and
deep-seated, particularly with Doha-based, Egyptian-born Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
one of the world’s most important Islamic thinkers and a significant influence in Qatar
as well as within the Brotherhood. "Saudi Arabia has Mecca and Medina. We have
Qaradawi,” former Qatari justice minister and prominent lawyer Najeeb al Nauimi told
The Wall Street Journal a decade ago.

Qaradawi’s stunning speech

In the absence of an indigenous Qatari class of Islamic legal scholars, Qaradawi and to
a lesser extent Libyan Muslim Brother Ali Al Salabi, while in exile in Doha, filled a void
to influence policy. They helped shield Qatar, the only other Wahhabi state besides Saudi Arabia, against becoming totally dependent on the kingdom’s ultra-conservative clergy.

A stunning speech by Qaradawi in late May before the ascension of Tamim, who was in
recent years Qatar’s main interlocutor with the Saudi kingdom, hinted that change may
be in the air. In line with Saudi encouragement of the divide between Sunni and Shia
Muslims, Qaradawi urged Muslims with military training to join the anti-Bashar al-Assad struggle in Syria. His condemnation of Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah (Party
of God) was immediately endorsed by Saudi grand mufti Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh as was his assertion that al-Assad's Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shia Islam, was "more infidel than Christians and Jews."

As a result, the downfall of the Brotherhood and the recent counter-response by Saudi
Arabia may not deprive the group of its main foreign backer but could well change the
tone and approach of Qatari policy towards popular revolts in the Middle East and North
Africa. It could also raise the bar for revolutionary forces in the region - a struggle that
is certain to shape the Middle East and North Africa’s identity and future.


James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of
Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent
World of Middle East Soccer.

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FIFA reaffirms its role as pillar of established order


By James M. Dorsey

A recent visit by world soccer body FIFA president Sepp Blatter to the Middle East spotlighted the group’s role as a pillar of the existing political and football governance order under the guise of a fictional separation between sports and politics rather than a force for greater transparency and accountability.

To be sure, Mr. Blatter’s support during his visit of Israeli Football Association (IFA) chief Avi Luzon upheld the principle of a ban on government interference in the affairs of national soccer associations. It also demonstrated that it is a principle that works to some degree in functioning democracies but becomes a farce in autocracies where governments control governance of the game with or without the façade of formal elections.

The main thrust of Mr. Blatter’s visit was to ease Israeli restrictions that hamper Palestinian soccer. Nevertheless, his thinly veiled threat that the IFA would be suspended and the Israeli national team banned from international competitions put a halt to calls by Israeli culture and sport minister Limor Livnat for Mr. Luzon’s resignation because of an alleged conflict of interest. A committee appointed by Mr. Livnat demanded Mr. Luzon’s resignation of Luzon on the grounds that his affiliation with soccer club Maccabi Petah Tikva was in conflict with his position as head of the IFA.

Mr. Livnat’s gunning for Mr. Luzon was no doubt politically motivated. Mr. Luzon chaired Maccabi prior to become IFA president but still attends the club’s games. Nevertheless, what Mr. Blatter’s support did not do was ensure an independent investigation into the allegation that would have been in line with best practice rather than uphold soccer governance’s policing of itself. That policing mechanism is fundamentally flawed witness the massive corruption scandals that have rocked world soccer in the last three years.

By the same token, FIFA has effectively been a pillar of autocracy in the Middle East and North Africa by seldom intervening in a world in which soccer associations are controlled by the ruler’s pawns or members of ruling families. In doing so, it has allowed autocrats to control the only non-religious institution that provides a venue for protest in the absence or advance of a popular revolt.

The mosque and the soccer pitch constitute the two venues where autocrats cannot simply crackdown on protesters because of the fact that football is the one thing that evokes the kind of deep-seated emotion that religion does and the sheer number of people involved in a soccer-crazy part of the world.

Beyond the key role that militant soccer fans played in successful anti-autocratic revolts like the overthrow in 2011 of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, the soccer pitch has become a venue of protest in a host of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco and Algeria.

Underlying FIFA’s failure to enforce best practice and its non-interference in government manipulation is the fictional notion that politics and sports do not and should not mix. Nothing could be further from the truth irrespective of whether in a democracy or an autocratic system. One just needs to look at the composition of the FIFA executive board or the International Olympic Council as recently highlighted by investigative German sports journalist Jens Weinreich.

Greater transparency and accountability as well as the enabling of powerful international sports associations to live up to their lofty principles and values would be significantly enhanced by recognizing reality for what it is: sports and politics are inextricably intertwined. Denial of this fact of life undermines and lacks credibility. 

That sports and politics are intertwined is evident at every twist of the road from the direct involvement of rulers, politicians and governments in the boards and executive committees of regional and international sports associations to the use of mega events by nations and governments to the role that global governing bodies play in the legitimization of rulers. Recognizing that reality would open the door to enforcing a charter or code of conduct that would govern the relationship of sports and politics. That is of course the one thing that neither politics nor the existing sports governance structure does not want.


James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies as Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg, and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.