US Tightrope Walk: Arab Autocrats Try to Redefine Terrorism

RSIS presents the following commentary US Tightrope Walk: Arab Autocrats Try to Redefine Terrorism By James M. Dorsey It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 148/2013 dated 12 August 2013 US Tightrope Walk: Arab Autocrats Try to Redefine Terrorism By James M. Dorsey Synopsis The United States is walking a tightrope with US Secretary of State John Kerry’s controversial endorsement of the toppling of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi as a “restoration of democracy”. The endorsement is likely to be seen by Islamist and non- Islamist anti-government protesters as backing for conservative Arab autocrats who project their crackdowns on opposition forces as a ‘struggle against terrorism’. That perception will gain currency as Egyptian security forces prepare to crack down on mass pro-Morsi demonstrations in Cairo. Commentary US SECRETARY of State John Kerry sought to position his controversial endorsement of Egypt’s military coup as part of the Obama administration’s support for popular demands for change.  Kerry noted that millions of Egyptians had backed the ousting of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president. In doing so, Kerry lent support to the equally controversial notion of Morsi having been deposed by ‘popular impeachment’ - as put forward by Mona Ekram-Obeid, an Egyptian politician with close ties to the Mubarak regime and the military. Redefining terrorism? Kerry’s endorsement, willy-nilly, provided cover for the military which has justified its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood - involving the arrest of hundreds of Brothers, legal proceedings against leaders of the Brotherhood, closure of media associated with the group and the targeting of businesses believed to support it – as a fight against violence and terrorism. It is likely to be also exploited by autocrats across the region who justify brutality by security forces and restrictions on freedoms as a ‘struggle against terrorism’. By defining legitimate, peaceful, democratic opposition to the government as terrorism, Middle Eastern and North African autocrats like Egyptian supreme military commander, deputy prime minister and defence minister General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi; Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa; King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia; and embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have arguably given the battle against political violence and terrorism a new meaning. The Brotherhood’s mass protest against the coup, continued demonstrations against Bahrain’s minority Sunni rulers despite a brutal crackdown two years ago, and intermittent minority Shiite protests in Saudi Arabia, have all been largely peaceful. The protests against Assad morphed into an insurgency and civil war only after the regime persistently responded brutally with military force. Yet, the rulers of Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Syria have denounced their own domestic opponents as ‘terrorists’. To be sure, the crackdown on the Brotherhood in Egypt is making it more difficult for the group’s leadership to control its more  militant fringe, sparking incidents of violence on both sides of the divide as well as a swelling insurgency in the Sinai. In many ways, the redefinition of terrorism revives the notion of one man’s liberation fighter being another’s terrorist. It is designed to force domestic public opinion and the United States to choose between autocracy or illiberal democracy and the threat of terrorism. It is an echo of the argument used by ousted autocrats including Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia’s Zine El Abedeine Ben Ali and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh to justify their repressive policies. Cover for crackdown on political dissent The attempt at redefinition has allowed King Hamad to call on the Bahraini Parliament to enact 22 counter-terrorism recommendations it adopted last month that would ban many expressions of political dissent. The recommendations include revoking citizenship of those linked to terrorism; banning sit-ins, rallies, and public gatherings in the capital Manama; granting carte blanche to security forces; and prohibiting use of social media to organise protests. The implementation of the recommendations is likely to be put to the test on August 14 when opposition groups plan anti-government demonstrations. The recommendations no doubt seek to exploit a sense of alarm among Bahrainis after a car bomb blast last month near a mosque in Manama, the most serious of a string of sporadic acts of political violence on the Gulf island. Bahraini officials lay the blame for the violence at Iran’s doorstep, which it accuses of fostering terrorism and interfering in the island’s domestic affairs. The criminalisation of political opposition is more likely to be a recipe for increased political violence stemming from mounting frustration and despair. Egypt has so far largely been spared political violence despite incidents in the Sinai desert which the military has sought to link to the Brotherhood without providing any evidence. Violence so far has involved security forces targeting pro-Morsi protesters. By the same token, the crackdown on the Brotherhood as well as the military-guided government’s vow to no longer tolerate the mass protests hardly lends credibility to assertions that the Brotherhood should drop its demand that Morsi be reinstated and take its rightful place in the political process. US walking on thin ice European, African and US mediators are seeking to mediate a compromise that allows the military and the Brotherhood to reach an accommodation without losing face. Kerry’s description of the coup as a ‘restoration of democracy’ may well have been a gesture to create the basis for such a compromise. His reference to popular support for the coup nonetheless puts the Obama administration on thin ice as cracks begin to appear among the opponents of the Brotherhood while supporters of the Brothers maintain their peaceful protests against the military intervention. Already, prominent Egyptian opposition figures have voiced concern that support for the coup is leading to the restoration of significant pillars of the Mubarak-era autocracy and a dialogue of the deaf that promises a zero-sum-game approach to politics rather than pluralism. Kerry’s endorsement of Morsi’s ouster is highly controversial as it marked a dramatic reversal in the US position of support for peaceful, democratic change as underscored clearly in President Obama’s January 2009 inaugural address. Obama had then warned autocrats across the globe: "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history." Two years later, after popular uprisings had toppled the autocratic leaders of Egypt and Tunisia and were threatening the rulers of Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria, Obama went a step further. He sought to put the US behind anti-government protests in the Middle East and North Africa while at the same time avoiding a rupture with the region’s autocrats. “We cannot hesitate to stand squarely on the side of those who are reaching for their rights, knowing that their success will bring about a world that is more peaceful, more stable, and more just,” he said in a major Middle East policy speech. Obama’s policy in the Middle East and North Africa has been driven by a desire to live up to American ideals and put the US “on the right side of history” while at the same time protecting US national interests by avoiding a rupture with the region’s autocrats. That precarious balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult. To maintain its tightrope act, the Obama administration will have to draw a clear distinction between peaceful, legitimate and democratic expression of dissent and terrorism. Failure to do so will increasingly, in public perception in the Middle East and North Africa, put it in the camp of those seeking to stymie political change.    James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan  Culture of the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Click here for past commentaries. Find us on Facebook. Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre. Please click here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.Click here to update your subscription in RSIS mailing list.

The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt

RSIS presents the following commentary The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt by James 
M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly

forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  

RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg

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No. 136/2013 dated 22 July 2013

The US Bogeyman in Post-coup Egypt

By James M. Dorsey

Synopsis

The military overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi has presented the Obama

administration with a dilemma. While the US saw its tacit backing for the Saudi-backed

military intervention as a way of steering Egypt towards a more consensual transition to

democracy, the military viewed its toppling of Morsi as an opportunity to deal a body

blow to the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently the US has become the bogeyman of

both the revolutionary youth movement and the Brothers.

Commentary

THE SAUDI-supported military overthrow of Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi on 3

July 2013 following massive demonstrations against him throughout Cairo and Egypt

presented the United States with a dilemma. The Obama administration was hard-pressed
to deflect the perception of US’ tacit support for the coup while calling for an inclusive

electoral process that would enable the Muslim Brotherhood to contest again for

parliamentary and presidential seats which they had been elected to before.

The US refusal to call the ouster of Morsi  a coup, combined with its long-standing financial

assistance to various pro-democracy groups, was perceived as proof that the US backed

efforts to create an illiberal democracy in Egypt.

Between democracy and stability

Such an outcome would prevent the return to power of Islamists who would challenge

the military’s efforts to contain the wave of change sweeping across the Middle East and

North Africa. Such a nuanced US message is hard to convey in a zero-sum environment

where anti-Morsi forces see the Morsi government as not inclusive while the Muslim

Brotherhood view Morsi’s overthrow as illegal.

The US reaction to the Egypt coup shows that its policy hinges on two ideas: democracy

and stability, which constitutes the dilemma. As a result this perpetually causes it

problems in the region. Moreover it has limited options because the Saudis are countering

the efforts of any potential cut-off of  US aid  while what constitutes US power has changed.

A small but significant sign of this change is that both the Brotherhood and the Tamarud

(Rebel) youth movement that had petitioned Morsi’s resignation refused to meet the US

Deputy Secretary of State William Burns when he visited Cairo last week; he could only

meet the military leaders.

The US parted ways with Saudi Arabia on Egypt when the military coupled its toppling of

Morsi with a crackdown on the Brotherhood, with mass arrests, legal proceedings, targeting

of Brotherhood-affiliated businesses and closure of Islamist media. The US tacitly agreed to

the removal of Morsi but not a witchhunt against the Brotherhood which will lead to an

illiberal democracy at best, and further volatility rather than a way out of the crisis.

The mass protest by the Brotherhood as well as its resolve to fight the coup and what it

sees as the illegal ouster of Morsi in the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities

demonstrates that it may be down but it is certainly not out. The crackdown as well as the

nature of the military-approved roadmap for Egypt’s return to an elected government

guarantees that the country will be at best a guided democracy - restricted or controlled

behind-the-scenes by the military.

Ignore the economy at your peril

The Obama administration’s message is further called into question by the fact that its

support for pro-democracy groups included aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

that served as fronts for anti-Morsi politicians and even a former US-based police officer

who advocated violence. The US position is likely to be complicated as the broad anti-Morsi

coalition -- whose left-wing, liberal, Salafi, pro-ancien regime and youth wings agree on

little else besides Morsi’s downfall -- inevitably falls apart.

With the exception of the supporters of former autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, who was toppled

by a popular revolt in March 2011, few members of the coalition are likely to be happy with a government that may well  roll back hard-fought freedoms acquired two years ago.

Initial indications from the interim government suggest a return to Mubarak-era economics

that sparked the uprising in the first place. Anti-Morsi forces have failed to heed a key lesson

from Morsi’s failure: ignore the economy at your peril. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates

and Kuwait – Gulf states hostile to the Brotherhood – have thrown the military and the

government a life line with US$12 billion in immediate aid. This has allowed it to entertain

rejecting, like its predecessor, a US$4.8 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that

would have forced it to introduce the unpopular reforms needed to tackle the economy’s

structural problems.

A no-win situation

The US’ dilemma is indicative of the contradiction between the Obama administration’s

rhetoric and its policy as well as its struggle to balance lofty ideals -- promotion of democracy

and human rights -- with perceived short-term interests. Wholehearted support for change in

the Middle East and North Africa would put the US at odds with almost all its Arab allies that

are governed by repressive, autocratic leaders and could endanger continued Egyptian

adherence to the peace treaty with Israel.

The contradictions mean that the US in effect responds to developments on the ground on a

case-by-case basis. By definition, that ambiguity makes it a target against the backdrop of a

policy that for decades saw autocrats as guarantors of stability at the expense of increasingly disenfranchised and discontented populace seeking social justice and greater freedom.

US options in Egypt are limited. Saudi Arabia has already pledged to compensate Egypt should

the US cut off its US$1.5 billion in primarily military aid.  Moreover, US power is globally

reduced by the fact that the world has changed. It no longer deals primarily with dependent,

poor nations playing both ends of the cold war. These countries have become largely

middle-income nations, and have alternative options in a multi-polar world. As a result the US

faces a no-win situation in Egypt.

James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),

Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of

the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, 

The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

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Middle East and North Africa:Another year of Upheaval

RSIS presents the following commentary Middle East and North Africa: Another year of Upheaval by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg

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No. 011/2013 dated 23 January 2013

Middle East and North Africa:
Another year of Upheaval

 By James M. Dorsey
       

Synopsis

Political turmoil and violence promise to shape events in the Middle East and North Africa this year. Monarchies are replacing republics in facing the tidal wave of reform demands in the region. Syria continues to be wracked by civil war while post-revolt nations like Egypt struggle to build a more open society.

Commentary

THE PRE-and post-revolt Arab leaders in the Middle East and North Africa face challenges ranging from political uprisings to violent confrontations, with Gulf monarchies replacing republics facing the brunt of the tidal wave of reform demands that have been sweeping across the region the past two years.

In Jordan opposition groups boycotted parliamentary elections in protest against alleged gerrymandering. The boycott follows weeks of intermittent demonstrations that suggested that King Abdullah’s room to manoeuver is closing. The king enjoys a degree of legitimacy that ousted Arab leaders like Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi could not claim. That legitimacy was called into question with protesters for the first time shouting ‘The people want to topple the regime’ and is likely to be further challenged by the election of a parliament that will look little different from the last one.

International community’s policy dilemmas

Egypt, in the throes of a convoluted post-revolt transition, is bracing itself for renewed street violence when a Cairo court announces its verdict on January 26 in the case against 73 people, including nine mid-level security officials, accused of responsibility for the death a year ago of 74 soccer fans in a politically charged brawl in the Suez Canal city of Port Said. At issue is the difficulty in reforming institutions, in this case the overpowering and deeply resented police and security forces.

Two years into the uprising-turned-civil war in Syria, there seems no end in sight to the brutal conflict that according to United Nations estimates, has already cost the lives of 60,000 people. There seems little doubt that President Bashar al-Assad will not retain the upper hand eventually. But there is little reason to believe that his downfall will mean an end to violent confrontation and the territorial integrity of post-Assad Syria has been thrown into doubt. Fears of what post-Assad Syria will look like are enhanced by the rise of militant Islamist forces in the armed resistance against the Assad regime as well as the rise of Kurdish nationalism and concern that Assad’s Alawite sect may see secession as its survival strategy.

Besides mounting concern about post-Assad Syria, there is a new development in the form of a fatal terrorist attack on a remote gas production facility in the Algerian desert in response to French intervention in neighbouring Mali. A counter-attack by Algerian forces to the take-over of the gas plant left scores of foreign hostages dead. The fact that the rebel advance in north Mali had to be repulsed by French military forces highlight the policy dilemmas confronting the international community posed by the irresistible thrust for greater freedom by ethnic and minority groups across the Sahel region.

Decade of political turmoil and violence

All these bode ill for potential conflict in the oil-rich Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia, where efforts to fend off popular revolts with huge social spending are wearing thin. Gulf monarchies like Jordan (apart from Bahrain’s royal family), still maintain a degree of legitimacy but their ability to leverage is being reduced by their failure to address key popular demands that would allow greater political freedom but dilute their absolute power. The outlook for not just another year but a decade is one of volatility, political turmoil and violence in a region that stretches from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Gulf.

What all these situations have in common is the fact that suppressed populations and ethnic groups increasingly no longer are willing to simply turn the other cheek. They also raise concerns about regional and international policies that in the case of countries like Algeria, Jordan and the Gulf states are tantamount to an ostrich sticking its head in the sand. Leaders seem to be hoping that mounting unrest and discontent can be contained without the introduction of political change and that they can crack down on violent jihadist groups without addressing the underlying issues that provide them a feeding ground.

The West, China and Russia, still stuck in a mould that favours stability over inevitable albeit messy political change, were caught off guard by the popular revolts that toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen and dragged Syria into civil war. They have yet to apply the lessons from these popular revolts to the rest of North Africa and the Middle East.

Addressing popular grievances

Similarly, the lesson of the defeat of Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was that it was as much a result of the Arab populations ignoring the group’s call for jihad in favour of people power as the war on terror. Extremist militants in Mali and Algeria, even when they employ the Al Qaeda label, are motivated by local grievances rather than global jihad and capitalise on the failure of governments to address those grievances. Failure to recognise that the solution is addressing popular grievances constitutes as much a threat to long-term stability as allowing those grievances to fester in a key corner of the world. Short-term volatility and instability is inevitable as the regional push for change continues. The international community would be well advised to seriously help post-revolt nations manage transition, steer pre-revolt countries towards managed reform and in the confrontation with jihadists to ensure that military and law enforcement measures are grounded in policies that address underlying grievances.

   
James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and co director of the Institute for Fan Culture of the University of Wuerzburg in Germany.. He is the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

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Expert (JMD): Lack of confidence on both sides prevent Iran and U.S. from holding talks

Expert: Lack of confidence on both sides prevent Iran and U.S. from holding talks

5 April 2012, 11:52 (GMT+05:00)

Azerbaijan, Baku, April 4 /Trend S.Isayev/

Iran and the U.S. both have a deficit confidence towards each other, and this prevents parties from holding talks, Senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, James M. Dorsey told Trend.

The expert was commenting on the recent statement by Expediency Council Chairman, ex president of Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who urged the Islamic Republic to hold direct talks with the United States.

Today, there are no formal diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States. Relations between the two nations began in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, and after an era of close alliance between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime and the American government, the relations between Islamic Republic and the United States have gone downhill after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

During his recent meeting with heads of the International Studies Journal, Rafsanjani underscored that If Iran is able to negotiate with such world powers as China and Russia, it should do the same towards the West.

"Iranians believe not completely without reason that the ultimate U.S. and Israeli goal is regime change," Dorsey said. "Barak Obama for his part is walking a tight rope in an election year trying to avoid military escalation while at the same time keeping Israel and his Republican opponents at bay. He has signalled that regime change is not his goal but there is little in practice to back up his words".

Dorsey added that while Obama has ruled out containment, which is an effective acceptance of Iran's potential as a nuclear power, he has not ruled out military action.

"In many ways, the question is who blinks first with the danger that no one will blink cause neither party can afford to do so for domestic reasons," Dorsey underscored.

Speaking with regard to the sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic, Dorsey said that the U.S. is counting on the sanctions hurting to a degree that they will force a change in Iranian policy, adding that Iran's has a high pain tolerance level.

"The recent stepping up of US sanctions tightens the screws on Iran and complicates its oil sales but by no way cuts them off," he said.

Soccer in Guantanamo – a duel between Republicans and Democrats

Guantanamo's $750,000 soccer pitch

By James M. Dorsey

A row in the US Congress over Pentagon spending on a soccer pitch for suspected terrorists incarcerated in Guantanamo focuses attention on the importance of the beautiful game to both the militants and their counter-terrorist detractors.

The $744,000 pitch outside a $39 million penitentiary-style building known as Camp 6 at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is intended to  reward the most cooperative of the facility’s 120 171 inmates. It builds on US efforts to employ soccer over the past decade as evidence that it complies with the Geneva Conventions and to reduce tensions between the militants and their wardens.

The pitch, set to be inaugurated next month once contractors have installed latrines and goals, is surrounded by guard towers and surveillance cameras and accessible by a secure walkway to reduce contact and conflict between the inmates and their captors.

It is also yet another example of the US government’s use of soccer in its battle for the hearts and minds of militants and their potential supporters. If soccer was a bonding and recruitment tool for jihadists across the globe, it could well serve to reinforce rehabilitation.

That is a notion that doesn’t go down well in an election year and at a time of economic crisis with President Barak Obama’s Republican opponents in the US Congress.

"Seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars for crying out loud? Our deficit this year is $1.2 trillion and we're spending this kind of money on terrorists?" asked Florida Republican member of the House of Representatives Gus Bilirakas in a television interview.

Dennis Ross, another Florida Republican went a step further. He introduced in Congress what he dubbed the ‘NO FIELD Act’ or None of Our Funds for the Interest, Exercise, or Leisure of Detainees Act, which would reduce the Defence Department's 2013 budget by $750,000 – the soccer pitch’s price tag.

Guantanamo "should not be a place of comfort. It should house the worst of the worst of the world's terrorists, not be a training ground for the World Cup,” McClatchy Newspapers quoted Mr. Ross as saying.

“Though it’s a tough choice to say who deserves more blame for such apparent waste, fraud and abuse, the genius who thought up the soccer field in the first place, or the contractor fleecing Uncle Sam for a small dirt field surrounded by a green fence, one thing is certain – this episode shows President Obama’s priorities in action,” said retired Navy Commander and former Pentagon spokesman J. D. Gordon who served as an advisor to Herman Cain’s failed 2012 Republican presidential campaign in an op-ed on Fox News.

Guantanamo commander Rear Admiral David B. Woods told McClatchy that construction costs were high because all equipment and supplies had to be imported to the 116-square-kilometer base in southeast Cuba.

"That's probably the biggest misperception and lack of understanding of the expense of doing things down here. It's unlike any place else in the world mainly because we don't have the opportunity to capitalize on the local economy,” Admiral Woods said.

Over the past decade, soccer has constituted part of the United States’ soft power tools in seeking to win hearts and minds. The US administration in Iraq in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein made the construction and rehabilitation of soccer stadiums and clubs a priority in a bid to counter efforts by militants to make inroads among the country’s youth.

US military and civilian officials argued that reopening soccer stadiums and encouraging people to play free of fear or persecution would win hearts and minds among those scarred by regimes for which soccer was either the enemy or a weapon of terror.

Members of the US 87th Infantry's 1st battalion were thrashed 9:0 a few years ago when they played the Sons of Iraq, a team made up of former insurgents, on a makeshift pitch on a dirt field in northern Iraq. As far as the Americans were concerned, their thrashing contained an important message: soccer balls can be more powerful than bombs. "You lose a game, but you win a lot of friends," said Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, the then commander of the 1st Armored Division and Multi-National Division North.

Before US-led coalition troops entered Baghdad in 2003, Saddam Hussein's men went into the neighbourhoods and passed out guns and stored weapons in schools. Because it was too dangerous to drive the trailers away through the streets, American forces blew them up - and in the process, damaged schools and surrounding homes. Though the US military returned to clear away the debris, distribute soccer balls and help set up teams and leagues in tense towns like Ramadi and Sadr City, unexploded shells remain in fields and school-yards where children kick their balls.

With an estimated 42 million land mines or two landmines per person in Iraq in a nation of 24 million, US Provisional Reconstruction Teams partnered with Spirit of Soccer, a Johnstown, Pennsylvania NGO that employs soccer to educate youth about the risk of mines. Trained by Spirit of Soccer, Iraqi coaches, including women, discussed fair play, avoiding dangers from land mines and other unexploded munitions, sportsmanship, tolerance and the need for non-violent conflict resolution while dribbling and kicking penalties. Participants returned to their communities as coaches and organizers of Youth Soccer and Mine Awareness Festivals.

In Afghanistan, US-led international forces played shortly after their 2001 overthrow of the Taliban soccer against an Afghan team in Kabul’s Ghazi Stadium to highlight the change they were bringing to the war-ravaged country. The stadium had been used by the Taliban for public executions, stonings and amputations. Americans and Iranians competed in Iran in the reconstruction of soccer pitches as a way of earning brownie points.

Soccer may seem an odd foreign policy tool or military priority. But with at least half the population of Iraq and Afghanistan under the age of 18, soccer balls and shoes are as basic to mending the two countries’ social fabric as beams and girders are to mending the damaged buildings. Indeed, the future of Iraq as well as Afghanistan and US relations with both countries may well in part depend on soccer paraphernalia and US efforts to prevent political interference and sectarian strife from undermining the two nations’ soccer performance.

Clearly, it will take more than a soccer training, a soccer league and a successful national team to overcome Iraq' and Afghanistan’s ethnic, religious and social divisions. Yet sociologists suggest that soccer can play a role in strengthening feelings of unity and national identity. Sports can also have a cathartic effect by channelling human aggression away from violence and into more healthy channels. Nelson Mandela used a racially integrated national rugby team to unite South Africa in the wake of apartheid -- a story now made famous by the movie Invictus. South Africa went on to become the first African nation to successfully host the World Cup.

These are lessons that may be lost on the Republicans but they are certainly not lost on militants. The most radical militants including Al Qaeda’s Somalia affiliate as well as some 

Saudi and Egyptian Salafi sheikhs denounce soccer as the infidel’s game because it was introduced by British colonialists and because of its potential to compete with Islam, particularly as a release valve in autocratic environments. Saudi Arabia recognized soccer’s competitive power during the 2010 World Cup when it, afraid that believers would forget their daily prayers during matches broadcast live on Saudi TV, rolled out mobile mosques on trucks and prayer mats in front of popular cafes where men gathered to watch the games.

More mainstream militants like the late Osama Bin Laden, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah are fervent soccer fans who use the game as a bonding and recruitment tool. Soccer brought recruits into the fold, encouraged camaraderie and reinforced militancy among those who had already joined. The track record of soccer-players-turned suicide bombers proved their point.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.