UAE exploits soccer to counter charges of human rights abuse

By James M. Dorsey

The recent sentencing in the United Arab Emirates of scores of dissidents on charges of plotting to overthrow the government and UAE support for the military coup that ousted Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi has sparked assertions that the country is using its acquisition of Manchester City and a franchise to establish a New York-based Major League Soccer team to polish an image increasingly tarnished by autocratic and counterrevolutionary policies.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) in statements to The Guardian newspaper warned that the UAE was using soccer to launder its image. Former English Football Association chairman Lord Triesman has called for making a country’s human rights record one of the criteria for establishing whether a state entity or member of a ruling family passes the "fit and proper person test" for ownership of a Premier League club.

HRW along with Amnesty International, the Emirates Centre for Human Rights and prominent human rights lawyers and activists like Sir Geoffrey Robertson condemned the mass trial of 94 people of which 69 were sentenced to lengthy prison terms as unfair and a violation of due process because a denial of legal assistance while being held incommunicado pretrial, allegations of torture, and the lack of a right to appeal. In its response, the UAE justice ministry implicitly did not rule out torture, arguing that alleged victims should have reported abuse to the police.

The defendants, who include lawyers, teachers and academics, were accused of being Muslim Brothers. Deeply hostile to the group, the UAE backed the military coup against Mr. Morsi that has thrown Egypt into crisis and has since together with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait bankrolled the military-appointed successor of the ousted president. The backing was part of a larger Saudi-dominated effort to stymie the wave of protest and revolt that has been sweeping the Middle East and North Africa for more than two years. The Brotherhood last week rejected a mediation attempt in Egypt by a senior US official as well as the foreign ministers of the UAE and Qatar, the only Gulf state to back the group.

HRW researcher Nicholas McGeehan, describing the UAE as "a black hole" for basic human rights, told The Guardian that "In this situation, a Premier League club (Manchester City) is being used as a branding vehicle to promote and effectively launder the reputation of a country perpetrating serial human rights abuses. That should be of concern to football supporters as well as human rights organizations." The paper quoted Human Rights Watch as saying further that Abu Dhabi’s purchase of Manchester City enabled it to "construct a public relations image of a progressive, dynamic Gulf state, which deflects attention from what is really going on in the country".

The portrayal of acquisitions of prominent soccer clubs as an effort to launder a country’s reputation casts a shadow over a foreign and security policy as well as a soft power strategy deployed by both the UAE and Qatar that is designed to endear themselves to a Western public and embed themselves in the international community in a way that would ensure support in times of need. Both countries recall the success of Kuwait, another small Gulf state incapable of defending itself, in rallying the international community in 1990 and 1991 to force the withdrawal of invading Iraqi forces.

The linking by human rights activists of the acquisition of Western soccer clubs to the human rights record of the home countries of a buyer is closely linked to the emergence of mega-events like the World Cup which will be hosted by Qatar in 2022 as platforms for campaigns for human, labor and gender rights.

In addition to the World Cup, Qatar has bought Paris St. Germain while its state-owned global broadcaster, Al Jazeera, has secured rights for the Premier League as well as the French and the Italian soccer competitions. The network has further launched a sports network in the United States and is about to launch a 24-hour US-based news channel.

Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan, a member of the UAE’s ruling family, bought Manchester City in 2008. The sheikh is UAE deputy prime minister and minister of presidential affairs, a brother of Abu Dhabi crown prince and deputy supreme military commander Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, and a half-brother of UAE president Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan. He is also responsible as chairman of the Abu Dhabi judiciary for the court that convicted the dissidents.

UAE officials have insisted that the acquisition of Manchester City as well as this year’s agreement to invest in the creation of a 20^th Major League Soccer team was a personal rather than a government investment. Most analysts however, given the al-Nahyan’s grip on state affairs, take that assertion with a grain of salt. Manchester City has won since the acquisition sponsorship from major Abu Dhabi or UAE state institutions, including airline Etihad, telecommunications company Etisalat, investment company Aabar and the Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority.

Neither the UAE nor Qatar initially realized that the deployment of soft power using soccer would also entail that they would become more vulnerable to criticism of their adherence to human and other rights. So far, Qatar, despite foreign policy setbacks as a result of its backing of the Brotherhood and other Islamist forces, has proven more adept in deflecting the criticism, particularly on the issue of the rights of foreign workers, who constitute a majority of the population in both countries.

The Gulf state has until now been able to fend off demands by international trade unions that it allow the formation of independent workers’ organizations and endorse the principle of collective bargaining by taking far reaching steps to improve material working and living conditions. Qatar Foundation, a state-owned body focused on education and research, has adopted rules that oblige contractors to pay a worker’s ticket to Qatar from his or her home country and give employees three weeks’ vacation a year. Qatar is also looking at an overhaul of the recruitment system that would shield workers from becoming indebted to agents who charge exorbitant fees. The UAE and other Gulf states have sought to reform their foreign labor system, but to a lesser extent than Qatar.

James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies as Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg, and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

UEFA inquiry into sponsorship deals highlights problematic fight against corruption

UEFA Secretary General Gianni Infantino

By James M. Dorsey

The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Europe’s governing soccer body, is looking at possible violations of its fair value rule in sponsorship deals concluded by two of the continent’s foremost Gulf-owned clubs, Manchester City and Paris St. Germain (PSG), with state-owned entities in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The UEFA inquiry comes against the rocking of world soccer by multiple scandals in the past two years, including revelations this week of a massive match fixing scheme by Asian and European syndicates.

Friedhelm Althans, a German sports betting expert and one of the investigators of the match fixing scandal, told Der Spiegel that the scheme spotlighted the failure of UEFA and world soccer body FIFA to counter match fixing with software that would detect suspicious betting activity and spreads. Experts said the system identified questionable larger bets but was blind when the fraud involved a large amount of smaller bets in a number of different locations.

The UEFA inquiry also comes amid renewed controversy over Qatar’s winning of the 2022 World Cup that highlights the kind of relationships that make the rooting out of corruption and introduction of more transparent and accountable soccer governance difficult.

FIFA ethics investigator Michael J. Garcia said last month that he was reviewing allegations of wrongdoing by Qatar in its successful bid for the 2022 World Cup. A lengthy report in a French soccer magazine alleged corruption, but in effect only regurgitated facts that had been public for a long time. While those facts raise questions, they fail to constitute a case against Qatar.

The inquiry involves PSG’s $200 million a year deal with the Qatar Tourism Authority and Manchester’s $625 million arrangement with Ettihad, the Abu Dhabi airline. PSG is owned by Qatar Sports Investments (QSI), a state entity, while Manchester City was acquired by a member of the UAE royal family.         

UEFA’s fair value rule is designed to prevent owners from circumventing its Financial Fair Play rules by injecting cash into their clubs using entities under their control. The issue involved in the inquiry is the fact that the distinction between ownership of the two clubs and the entities involved in the sponsorship deals are blurry at best.

"We have a regulation which speaks about fair value of deals and the fact that a related party cannot just inject money into a club directly or indirectly,” said UEFA secretary general Gianni Infantino.

Nevertheless, the multiple scandals in soccer in recent years coupled with the failure of efforts to combat match fixing cast a shadow over the UEFA inquiry in an environment in which few are willing to give senior soccer officials the benefit of the doubt.

In the case of UEFA, widely seen within the soccer community as a model of good governance, that environment is fuelled in part by the fact that in the walk-up to the awarding of the World Cup then French president Nicolas Sarkozy invited Qatar’s crown prince, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani, and UEFA president Michel Platini to the Elysée Palace for a lunch attended by Sebastien Bazin, the European representative of PSG’s then majority American owners Colony Capital.

The lunch, media reports and sources said, was designed to salvage the financially troubled club at a time that it was hemorrhaging an estimated €20m a year. It crowned several months of efforts by Mr. Bazin to rekindle Qatari interest in acquiring the financially troubled club.

On the table, the reports and sources said, was a three-way deal: Qatar would acquire PSG and step up its already substantial investments in France, Mr. Platini, a member of world soccer body FIFA’s executive committee, whose son has since joined QSI as its legal counsel, would vote in favor of Qatar’s bid to host the World Cup; and Qatar’s state-owned Al Jazeera television network would have an opportunity to buy a stake in France’s Ligue 1 broadcast rights.

Mr. Sarkozy “was very interested in the dossier. He was keen because these people wanted to invest in France, but also because he’s a (PSG) supporter,” then Elysée spokesman Franck Louvrier was quoted as saying.

None of this necessarily crosses a red line, but it is illustrative of the existing cozy relationships in soccer in which perceptions of potential conflict of interest are unavoidable.

The match fixing scandal challenges soccer officials to crackdown on fraudulent schemes and an opportunity to be seen as enforcing good governance. The stakes for groups like FIFA and UEFA are high. Much of the recent scandals occurred from the perspective of fans in the out-of-reach stratospheres of world soccer. Match fixing is an issue in stadiums where they go to watch matches and in their homes where they see the game on their television screen.

“Fixing and corruption in sport has a long history. However, we of this generation, are facing something almost entirely new. It is a contemporary form of match-fixing - as if someone had taken fixing and injected it with steroids….  The key to the new form of fixing is globalization. In the last ten years, the sports gambling market has - like the music and travel industry - been utterly transformed. Now, gamblers in any part of the world can place a bet on almost any professional sports event in almost any country of the world,” said journalist Declan Hill in an article on the BBC Sports website.

Mr. Hill first revealed the role of Singaporeans in match-fixing in his book, The Fix.

“If we do not fight (match fixing) properly, it will destroy many sports as we know them. This new form of corruption will, like a tsunami, sweep aside all other issues and leave some sports dead and destroyed,” Mr. Hill warned.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog.

Unsere Freunde aus (JMD quoted in Tagespiegel)

Platini in BedrängnisUnsere Freunde aus Katar

30.01.2013 18:26 UhrVon Martin Einsiedler

Die Drei von der Bankstelle. Der neue Präsident von Paris St. Germain Nasser al-Khelaifi (l.) und Sportdirektor Leonardo (r.) stellten am Neujahrstag vor der Skyline von Doha einen... - FOTO: AFP

Das Emirat investiert aus politischen Interessen riesige Summen in den Sport, vor allem in Frankreich. Die Verbindungen reichen hinauf bis in den Präsidentenpalast und bis zum Uefa-Chef Michel Platini.

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Auf dem Fußballplatz erreichte der Sportler Michel Platini seine Ziele meist mit beeindruckender Eleganz. Der Mittelfeldspieler war derart veranlagt, dass er – wenn es denn sein musste – den Gegner mitunter ganz alleine, etwa mit einem seiner gefürchteten Freistöße, bezwang. Das Feld der Sportpolitik dagegen ist ungleich komplizierter, vielschichtiger – und auch begrenzter. So soll Platini nach einem Bericht der französischen Fußball-Wochenzeitschrift „France Football“ vom früheren französischen Staatspräsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy im November 2010 quasi dazu gedrängt worden sein, nicht für die USA, wie er es angeblich vorhatte, sondern für Katar als Ausrichter der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 2022 zu stimmen.

Das Ergebnis ist bekannt: Das Emirat Katar bekam den Zuschlag – unter anderem mit der Stimme von Platini in seiner Funktion als Exekutivmitglied des Fußball- Weltverbandes Fifa. Der Franzose, seit 2007 Präsident des europäischen Fußballverbandes (Uefa), bestreitet die Vorwürfe und droht nun, „vor Gericht gegen jede Person vorzugehen, die meine Integrität bei dieser Abstimmung infrage stellt“, wie er per Pressemitteilung bekannt gab.

Unter dem Titel „Qatargate“ veröffentlichte „France Football“ unter der Woche einen fünfzehn Seiten langen Bericht, der das konkretisierte, wovon ohnehin schon ausgegangen worden war: dass es bei der WM-Vergabe nach Katar nicht mit rechten Dingen zugegangen ist und dass die engen wirtschaftspolitischen Bande zwischen Frankreich und Katar den Sport nicht unberührt lassen.

Am 23. November 2010, so ging es bereits aus früheren französischen Medienberichten hervor, war es zu einem Treffen im Amtssitz des französischen Präsidenten in Paris gekommen. Am Tisch im Élysée-Palast saßen demnach Sarkozy, der katarische Kronprinz Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani, Sebastian Bazin, Europa-Repräsentant der US-Investmentfirma Colony Capital und damals noch Hauptaktionär des Fußballklubs Paris St. Germain, und eben Platini. Das Treffen soll bis auf Platini für alle zufriedenstellend verlaufen sein: Bazin wurde sein Verlustgeschäft mit PSG los, der Kronprinz aus Katar freute sich über eine weitere Investitionsmöglichkeit und Sarkozy war über die vielversprechende Zukunft seines neureichen Lieblingsklubs PSG schlicht „glücklich“, wie ihn sein Sprecher hernach zitierte. Blieb Platini da nichts anderes übrig, als seine Interessen denen seines Landespräsidenten unterzuordnen? Immerhin schaffte, ganz nebenbei, sein Sohn Laurent kurz darauf im Januar 2011 den Sprung in die Chefetage bei Qatar Sports Investment (QSI), jenem Ableger des Staatsfonds Qatar Investment Authority, der nun Eigentümer von PSG ist.

Der Deal mit PSG, dem Klub, der seit über anderthalb Jahren mit Geld nur so um sich wirft, sei dabei „nur Teil eines größeren Deals“ gewesen. Das erzählt James M. Dorsey, Autor des Blogs „The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer“ und ein viel beachteter Experte zum Thema Fußball im Nahen Osten. Das Emirat half nicht nur PSG aus der Klemme, sondern sämtlichen Klubs aus der französischen Ligue 1. Diese befürchteten schon drastische Einnahmeverluste bei den TV-Geldern – bis der Nachrichtensender Al-Dschasira aus Katar bekannt gab, Übertragungsrechte zu erwerben. Al-Dschasira, im Besitz des Emirs Hamad bin Chalifa Al Thani, beteiligt sich jährlich mit rund 300 Millionen Euro an den nationalen Live-Rechten.

Längst ist Katar, das kleine Land mit riesigen Öl- und Erdgasvorkommen und gerade einmal 1,7 Millionen Einwohnern, ein Global Player im Sport. „Katars finanzielles Engagement im Sport hat auch eine ganz klare sicherheits- und außenpolitische Dimension“, sagt Dorsey. „Vor drei bis vier Jahrzehnten machten sich Golfstaaten wie Katar Freunde, in dem sie einen großen Batzen Entwicklungshilfe zahlten.“ Heute arbeite man so nicht mehr. „Es geht nun darum, sich über verschiedene gesellschaftliche Ebenen in die internationale Staatengemeinschaft einzubetten. Kulturelle Diplomatie ist wichtig – und der Sport spielt hierbei für Katar eine wichtige Rolle.“

Um den sicherheitspolitischen Aspekt des immensen Sponsorings zu verstehen, genügt ein Blick in den Atlas. Das Emirat am Persischen Golf ist etwa halb so groß wie das Bundesland Hessen. Es ist eingekreist von den Regionalmächten Iran, Irak und Saudi-Arabien. Katar wäre ohne seine Bodenschätze nur ein unbedeutender Fleck. Doch in politisch unruhigen Zeiten in der Region genügt es nicht, sich auf seinem Vermögen auszuruhen. Es muss umgewandelt werden in verlässliche Partnerschaften mit einflussreichen Staaten. So ist es kein Zufall, dass die Tore des schwedischen Stürmers Zlatan Ibrahimovic für Paris St. Germain letztlich mit den Bodenschätzen aus Katar gezahlt werden. Frankreich ist einer der wichtigsten Verbündeten des Emirats. Die Partnerschaft gründet auf den gewaltigen Investitionen Katars im wirtschaftlich angeschlagenen Frankreich. Das Land hält Anteile an französischen Firmen wie etwa dem großen Mischkonzern Lagardère, dem Mineralölunternehmen Total S.A. oder auch der Luxusleder-Marke Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy. Dabei ist das Verhältnis geprägt von einem gegenseitigen Geben und Nehmen. 

Für den finanziellen Einsatz revanchierte sich Frankreich unter Sarkozy mit umfangreichen Steuererleichterungen für die im Land ansässigen Investoren aus Katar.

Frankreich nimmt die finanziellen Hilfen aus Katar nur allzu gerne an. Und das Emirat investiert und investiert, auch wenn die Geschäftsfelder – wie im Falle von PSG oder der Ligue 1 – aus rein ökonomischer Perspektive noch so unattraktiv sind. Doch auf das Geld braucht Katar nicht zu schauen. Das Land möchte mit seinen Investitionen nicht nur Bündnisse schmieden, es will auch sein internationales Ansehen erhöhen – und kaum etwas eignet sich dafür besser als der Fußball.

Der vorläufige Höhepunkt diesbezüglich soll die Austragung der Weltmeisterschaft 2022 werden. Michel Platini dürfte das Turnier dann vielleicht schon als Präsident des Weltverbands Fifa verfolgen.

JMD on BBC World Football: Qatar Takeover of PSG

Perennial underachievers Paris Saint-Germain have been sold to Qatari Investors, which could see PSG become one of Europe's elite. We'll discuss the controversial takeover with the new PSG General Manager Leonardo.

Download 13MB  http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/worldservice/wswf/wswf_20110916-1052a.mp3