Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven by Distrust and Inexperience

RSIS presents the following commentary Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven by  Distrust and Inexperience by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this  link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback  to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 027/2013 dated 13 February 2013 Post-revolt Arab Transitions: Driven by Distrust and Inexperience By James M. Dorsey        Synopsis Post-revolt Middle Eastern and North African countries are struggling to  manage the transition from autocratic to more transparent, accountable  societies. Increasingly prejudice, distrust and inexperience are proving to be  greater obstacles to a successful transition than resistance of vested interests  of former regimes or alleged Islamists. Commentary POST-REVOLT Arab nations are experiencing tumultuous times. The  assassination of a prominent Tunisian opposition leader has sparked mass protests  against Islamists held responsible for his death. Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali has  called for the replacement of the Islamist-dominated Cabinet by a government of  technocrats that would lead the country to elections, to the chagrin of his Ennahada  party that fears loss of power. Egypt has been wracked by violent street protests that have left more than 60 people  dead in three Suez Canal and Red Sea cities, forcing President Mohamed Morsi to  declare emergency rule and bring the military back into the streets and soccer  stadiums to maintain law and order. Underlying fault lines Underlying the volatility in Egypt and Tunisia as well as difficult transitions in Libya  and Yemen is the increasing lack of confidence between Islamists and  non-Islamist forces. That fault line is fuelled by an ever deeper secularist suspicion  that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists who by and large have emerged  from the revolts as the largest, most organised political force, are bent on creating  Islamist states and enforcing Islamic law. This mistrust drives the weakening of the  civilian and armed opposition to President Bashar Al Assad in the continuing civil   war in Syria. For their part, Islamists, including moderates, are not certain where the allegiances  of non-Islamists lie and whether significant segments of the secularists would opt for  a less free society in cooperation with institutions like the judiciary, the police and  security forces in a bid to halt what they see as an Islamist power grab. To be sure, the militancy and violence of more radical Islamists in Tunisia in recent  months as well as Morsi’s imperious style of government, his failed attempt to  acquire absolute power, his unilaterally pushing through of a controversial constitution,  his failed attempt to fire a state prosecutor and increased reliance on the despised  police and security forces, have done little to assuage anti-Islamist fears.  Similarly, Syrian opposition forces with Islamists in the lead have failed to convince the  country’s key minorities who could have made a difference in reducing the regime’s  power base, that there would be a place for them and that their rights would be  secured in a post-Assad Syria. Yet, lost in the mixture of misperception and prejudice is the recognition that Islamists  came to power virtually unprepared for government, having a history of a pressured  existence either underground, a legal nether land or exile. The Muslim Brotherhood,  two years after the overthrow of Mubarak and seven months after Morsi’s election as  president, remains nominally an illegal organisation in Egypt. As a result, this reinforces  a sense that he and the Brotherhood fail to truly understand the concept of democracy  and are more focused on fending off threats and settling old scores. A mental transition Morsi, like his counterparts in other post-revolt Arab nations, (apart from Libya that  suffers the consequences of Muammar Gaddafi’s refusal to build institutions), have  inherited states dominated by police and security forces and populated by institutions  molded by the former autocratic regimes with their own vested interests. It takes a  degree of political savvy, mastering of electoral politics, backroom horse trading, give- and-take and an ability to manage public expectations rather than the bunker mentality  in which Islamist leaders operated in the past. With few exceptions, they have yet to  demonstrate that they can make that mental transition. In retrospect, Morsi’s deft alliance late last year with the second echelon of Egypt’s  military command that allowed him to sideline long-serving commanders who  unsuccessfully sought to grab power in the period between his election and his  assumption of office, seems more an exception than an indication of his ability to  manoeuvre the minefield that constitutes Egyptian transition politics. Jebali’s call for an interim technocratic government in a bid to avert a second  popular revolt in Tunisia comes closest to Morsi’s rare display of political deftness in his handling of the military. It contrasts starkly with Morsi’s surprising reluctance  to tackle reform of the police and security forces who for many years targeted the  Muslim Brotherhood, his seeming willingness to maintain Mubarak-era structures  and his increased reliance on them despite the existence of reformists within all of  those institutions. Relative calm has returned to the streets of Egyptian cities, giving Morsi at best a  month to build bridges in advance of the country’s next flashpoint when a court in  Cairo pronounces verdict in the case of the remaining 52 defendants accused of  responsibility for the deaths of 74 soccer fans a year ago in a politically-loaded  brawl in Port Said. Flashpoint offers leverage To do so, Morsi would have to convincingly reach out to his detractors in a bid to  convince them that he has put the bunker mentality behind him, wants his government  to be inclusive rather than exclusive and that he is serious about reform of key state  institutions and is focusing on a turnaround of the country’s economy.  As much as the Port Said case constitutes a flash point – the court’s sentencing last  month of the first batch of 21 defendants to death sparked the most violent protests –  it also gives Morsi leverage. In the absence of a justification of the court’s ruling, a  leaked summary of the prosecution’s case put the blame for the brawl as much on the  police as it did on spectators in the stadium. The prosecutor’s case, coupled with human rights reports that document that the police  and security forces are a law unto themselves, provide Morsi with the ammunition to  start the difficult process of reforming law enforcement. It is a move that would prove  immensely popular and would help restore political calm needed to embark on a road  of economic recovery. A convincing move to amend the constitution in ways that removes fears of an Islamist  takeover would further serve to bridge the widening gap in Egyptian politics. It is too  early to write Morsi off as a failed leader. The ball is in his court, though time is running  out.     James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International  Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, co-director of the University  of Wuerzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World  of Middle East Soccer blog. Click here for past commentaries. Find us on Facebook. Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional  Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre.  Please click here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.