The Arab Revolts and South East Asia: What Impact and What Influence?

Actuelles de l’Ifri

The Arab Revolts and South East

Asia: What Impact and What

Influence?

Teresita Cruz-del Rosario

et James M. Dorsey

Southeast Asia experienced its own political upheavals well before the

Arab revolts. Nevertheless, the wave of popular uprisings that shook the

Middle-East and North Africa region goes far beyond the region’s boundaries,

and Southeast Asia is no exception to the global crisis of confidence towards

governments. 2011 was a year of massive demonstration of widespread and

deeply felt discontent that was willing and able to assert itself in powerful and

often new ways. Although contexts and political cultures differ, the impact of

the Arab revolts on Southeast Asia is already palpable. The consequences of

the wave of Arab protests on Southeast Asian countries carry their load of

opportunities and risks for governments, in political, social and economic

terms. But the impact is not one way, and Southeast Asian experiences could

represent a source of inspiration.


A Different Political Culture

In countries that have narrower opportunities for public redress, citizens

cleverly manoeuvre within tightly controlled spaces mainly through electoral

contests that do not directly challenge entrenched authority. Malaysians have

succeeded to get their messages across, created dents, raised questions,

and expanded spaces for public discourse. Filipinos, Thais and Indonesians

who have succeeded in regime change through relatively peaceful means,

redirected the course of political life and a qualitative shift in social life has

occurred. Thai voters returned to power the party of deposed premier Thaksin

Shinawatra through the landslide victory of his sister Yingluck --- a victory

forhis red-shirted supporters that in the past involved bloody clashes with the

military. For the moment, her unequivocal electoral victory ended years of

strife between red and yellow shirts and put the country back on a path of

relative stability and economic growth. In Burma, the generals have retreated,

and a new civilian government promises to deliver reforms, signaling a new

political direction for the country that would emulate market-based

democracies. In Indonesia, broad-based social movements have helped

restore democratic practice.


Since the eruption of the Arab uprisings, Myanmar has relaxed strict

government control in part for fear that the Burmese might be capable of the

kind of resilience displayed by Syrians in their 14-month old defiance of brutal

regime repression. Singapore's long-ruling People's Action Party has seen its

share of the electoral vote drop to a record low because of surging prices and

immigration and a new generation of young voters who espouse the values of

political choice and social change. In a further indication of sensitivity to

developments in the Middle East and North Africa and recognition of the need

for release valves, Singaporean bloggers were long able to get away with what

mainstream media could not(1). Malaysia has responded to sharp criticism of

the police by repealing two sweeping security laws and lifting restrictions on

the media even though a new restrictive assembly law and clashes between

police and demonstrators point in the opposite direction. In all of these

countries in Southeast Asia, grievances were channeled via organized efforts

of social movements.


In all of these countries thus far, political strife has not resulted in civil wars.

This is perhaps the singular feature that distinguishes protest action in

Southeast Asia from the Middle East. It also suggests that Southeast Asian

governments are likely to be more adept in responding to potential popular

discontent than entrenched Arab autocracies.


Further, most Southeast Asian countries have engaged in party politics

despite the imperfections in the development of political parties in this region.

Some countries like Malaysia have experienced the dominance of the Barisan

Nasional which has ruled the country for nearly two decades. Yet, opposition

politics led by Anwar is making inroads into the ruling party and will most likely

see the emergence of more vigorous electoral contests in the coming years.


In Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi has been elected to parliament in which her

party, the National League for Democracy, commands a respectable following.

The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia continue to struggle with political

party formation, so that these entities reflect broader programs for governance

rather than the personality of its front-runner candidates. Political evolution,

though slow and tedious, heralds the institutionalization of a political process

that in turn signals a forward march in the creation of a more modernized

political culture. For all the citizens of these countries, hopes are high that the

deepening of these processes will consolidate democracy and therefore

become irreversible.


For all Southeast Asian countries, an active electoral culture is in place, and

citizens do take their electoral rights seriously. They insist on the legitimacy of

their leaders through fair and honest elections. This should be construed as a

sign of political health, and a staunch adherence to a social contract between

government and their subjects.


Finally, social movements have been a part of the institutional life of Southeast

Asian countries. Even in Myanmar where civil society organizations including

media have faced severe restrictions, the Burmese found spaces within the

existing political opportunity structures to have their voices heard and

registered. In Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, social movements have

been an integral part of the fabric of social life. Where protest groups have

taken to the streets, these have been, by and large, relatively peaceful despite

the occasional violence and destruction to public property.


Interestingly, social movements in all these countries opt for an electoral

option, thus working within institutional means that are offered by a regime

which, in and of itself, desires to play by the rules of the “legitimacy game.”


However unpopular, regimes seek recourse to legitimatizing procedures, even

incurring the risk of potential loss. Thus far, all rulers seek a popular mandate,

never mind that they might engage in the occasional electoral manipulation to

ensure longevity. Notwithstanding fraudulent practices in electoral politics in

Southeast Asia, the quest for political legitimacy should be construed as a

hopeful development in the evolution of politics in these countries.


However flawed these processes are, most Southeast Asian nations are

poised to consolidate their economic and political gains in the years to come.

And in contrast to the Middle East and North Africa with its entrenched

autocracies, their governments have by and large displayed a greater degree

of attunement to what is happening around them with a greater deal of vision

and flexibility.


Energy Security Issue and Islamist Experience


If the Arab revolts and developments in Southeast Asia are both expressions

of a broader global trend, the impact on ASEAN nations of developments in

the Middle East is far more direct. As the Arab uprising inevitably spreads to

the Gulf, Southeast Asian nations will have to define the risk to their energy

security and develop alternatives in case of a disruption in oil and gas supplies

as well as increase their focus on alternative energy options. Some Southeast

Asian nations particularly the Philippines and Indonesia will also have to deal

with the impact of large numbers of migrant workers returning home to escape

erupting turmoil.


The energy security issue will no doubt shoot to the top of the agenda if or

more probably when the protests spread to Saudi Arabia and/or other major oil

producers. Non-oil producing Southeast Asian nations like Singapore,

Thailand and the Philippines depend on the Middle East for 70 per cent of the

oils and gas imports. In addition, Southeast Asia and the Middle East are

crucial links in a seaborne commerce conveyor belt that runs from the Gulf to

the Pacific. If the Straits of Malaka and Singapore were seen as potentially

among the most risky maritime choke points in the past, today it's the Straits of

Hormuz and Bab el. Mandeb, which is straddled by Somalia and Yemen. Asia

would be most affected if shipping particularly through the Strait of Hormuz

were to be interrupted. The US gets 22 per cent of its oil from the Gulf, Europe

about 30 per cent as compared to Asia’s whopping 75 per cent. Needless to

say, Asia has the most at stake in terms of energy security.


Southeast Asian governments and military and intelligence organizations are

monitoring closely the geopolitics of the Arab revolts as well as their fallout as

part of a global trend that expresses a lack of confidence in institutions with a

mixture of hope and anxiety.


The debate over the potential domestic fallout is to some degree coloured by

vested interests that have gained in strength and prominence in the wake of

9/11. For those whose budgets are boosted by perceptions of a terrorist threat,

the focus is on the rise of the Islamists in countries like Egypt and what this is

likely to mean, for example, for Islamist groups in Indonesia, Malaysia,

Thailand and Brunei.


To be sure, the rise of Islamist forces in the Middle East and North Africa

boosts confidence among Islamists in Southeast Asia. Yet, the tradition of

Islamist participation in Malaysian party politics dates back to the 1950s and

has proven its resilience despite the efforts to silence its proponents. Islamist

politics in Indonesia is no doubt gaining ground against more secular forces.

But it is doing so in a country that votes decidedly secular despite growing

religious intolerance and widespread corruption.


Beyond The Turkish Model A Southeast Asian Inspiration


As post-revolt and opposition forces in the Middle East and North Africa look

first and foremost to Turkey but also to Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore,

they are likely to have to first settle their post-revolt battles before they can

really build on the experiences of others. Despite all their warts, Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, the Philippines, and more currently,

Myanmar, have much to offer. Singapore alongside Malaysia constitutes

examples of multiculturalism which the Middle Eastern and North African

countries increasingly wracked by ethnic and sectarian cleavages will need.


Similarly, Indonesia stands as a model of reform of the military in a post-revolt

society, a model that, like Turkey, can only grow in significance as the push for

greater accountability and transparency moves forward in the Middle East and

North Africa. Finally, Myanmar’s path towards a more open political system

demonstrates that even the most intractable of regimes are capable of being

pried open.


Nonetheless, with the exception of Brunei, Southeast Asia is likely to be more

a question of a monsoon in which steady rain washes away entrenched

powers rather than an Arab Spring in which costly revolutions seek to replace

systems rather than reform them. Fact of the matter is that Southeast Asia

despite its political uprisings is a region of relative peace and stability. It has

posted one of the world’s highest growth rates and Southeast Asians enjoy

relative prosperity.

Southeast Asia is largely governed today by leaders whose legitimacy is

grounded in elections and who, by and large, have upheld their end of the

bargain in social contracts. In doing so, they have established structures that

are increasingly robust yet capable of embracing change. This is being

reinforced by Southeast Asia having one of the world’s fastest expanding

middle classes whose clamour for greater openness, transparency and

accountability is certain to make itself felt.


There is reason to believe that no matter how flawed the process is, most

Southeast Asian nations are poised to consolidate their economic and political

gains. The challenge will be for governments to see social movements and

street politics not as fundamental defiance to the system but as evidence that

social contracts are subject to the vigilance of their citizens.


The collective experience of Southeast Asia should boost confidence in the

region and hold out hope for the Middle East and North Africa. It is an

experience of volatility, of two steps forward and one step backward in the

immediate wake of a revolt and of the ultimate entrenchment of electoral

politics and the flourishing of civil society in the longer run. In short, Southeast

Asia shows that institutions, processes and mechanics, however flawed and

imperfect, can convert contentious springs into manageable monsoons. What

sets the experience in Southeast Asia apart from that in the Middle East and

North Africa is that in Southeast Asia grievances were channeled through the

organized efforts of social movements rather than suppressed by a military

crackdown on civil society.

(1) That could be changing with at least one blogger for the first time having been taken to task for what he

wrote and forced to retract some postings

Le programme Maghreb/Moyen-Orient de l’Ifri combine des recherches à long terme et à finalités

opérationnelles et une capacité d’analyses immédiates des bouleversements survenus dans le monde

arabe.

Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, PhD, is the Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Center for Asian Law Studies, National

University of Singapore

James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow in the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Les opinions exprimées dans ce texte n’engagent que leur auteur.

ISBN : 978-2-36567-033-3 © Tous drois réservés, Paris, Ifri

Egypt: Heading for more turbulence

RSIS presents the following commentary Egypt: Heading for more turbulence by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at   RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 107/2012 dated 21 June 2012 Egypt: Heading for more turbulence By James M. Dorsey        Synopsis Former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak’s fight for life during a key stage in his country’s troubled transition, is unlikely to influence the course of events. Egypt’s military rulers are battling it out with the Muslim Brotherhood and proponents of  political and economic reforms in a decisive phase of Egypt’s effort to move from autocracy to a more democratic state. Commentary Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak was fighting for his life this week as the country’s electoral committee postponed announcing the results of the presidential run-off between Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force general and last prime minister under Mr. Mubarak, and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi. With both candidates claiming victory, irrespective of whoever emerges victorious, the outcome of the election promises to increase volatility and unrest rather than put Egypt back on a path towards political stability and economic recovery. Victory for Mr. Shafiq would leave the Brotherhood feeling robbed of its electoral gains, while the youth and militant soccer fan groups who drove last year’s mass protests that ousted Mr. Mubarak after 30 years in office, would feel that their revolt had been hijacked. Eighteen months of transitory military rule have already taught them that overthrowing the head of state is a far cry from uprooting an entrenched political system. The problem of the  youth and soccer fan groups is that while Egypt’s armchair activists, the country’s silent majority, largely long for change, they may well opt for stability in the short run rather than the volatility, unrest and violence that pushing for real change would likely involve. The joker in the pack is the Muslim Brotherhood, a cautious political movement that has proven to be inclined to compromise rather than rock the boat. The Brotherhood, like Mr. Shafiq has declared victory in the presidential run-off and has threatened a second popular revolt if the electoral commission fails to confirm this. The Brotherhood has already called for mass protests on Cairo’s Tahrir Square against what it sees as the military’s usurpation of power. Unlike the youth and soccer fan groups, the Brotherhood still has the power to bring large numbers of its followers on to the streets. Turning confrontational A Morsi victory however would not make the situation in Egypt any less volatile. The ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in a series of moves in the past week has effectively neutered the incoming president by declaring that he would only be in office until a new parliament is elected and a new constitution promulgated. The military council dissolved Egypt’s first freely elected, post Mubarak people’s assembly after the Constitutional Court declared the election of one third of its members unconstitutional. SCAF further issued an annex to the current constitution giving it a significant role in the drafting of a new constitution, depriving the new president of the right to initiate new legislation and stripping him of control of the defence budget and the military. If the toppling of Mubarak was relatively bloodless compared to the overthrow of Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi and the brutal 15-month old struggle to depose Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, the next phase in the battle for Egypt's future threatens to be far more confrontational. The military last year championed the protesters' cause because that allowed it to protect its political, economic and social interests. The rise of the deep state Those interests are now at stake as the military is pitted against the protesters, the Brotherhood and others seeking to curb the military's powers and return it to the barracks. The military has, since Mubarak's fall, refrained from reforming the interior ministry and the security forces that were the brutal enforcers of the former president's regime. It recently declared its right to make arbitrary arrests in what many see as a return of the police state. In doing so, the military has focused attention on the Egyptian deep state – a network of vested political, military and business interests -- similar to the one in Turkey that took decades to uproot. The return of the police state, the emasculation of the presidency and the resurrection of the interior ministry in the old regime’s mould pits the military not only against the Brotherhood, the country's foremost political force, but also against the ultras, Egypt's fearless, street-battle hardened group of militant soccer fans who have years of experience in confronting the security forces and for whom an unreconstructed interior ministry has the effect of waving a red cloth at a bull. Also sharpening the battle lines is the statement by military officials to state-owned newspaper Al Ahram that it would not allow the Brotherhood to take power. The paper quoted a military source as saying that the military would only return to the barracks once "a balanced political process"  had been achieved, a code word for a system that guarantees the military's sway over politics as well as its economic privileges and social perks. The source justified the military's position in nationalist terms by portraying the Brotherhood as a pawn of the United States and the European Union. A Morsi victory gives reformers a chance to fight for greater accountability, transparency and freedom from within the system. However, like a Shafiq victory, it is unlikely to make the transition in Egypt any less volatile. Nor will the outcome of the presidential run-off transform Cairo's Tahrir Square any time soon from being a focal point for political agitation to simply functioning as a traffic circle. In the unfolding battle, Mubarak dead or alive has become a side event in a show that threatens to be messy and potentially violent. James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He has been a journalist covering the Middle East for over 30 years. Click here for past commentaries. Find us on Facebook. Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre. Please click here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.

International pressure persuades Israel to release Palestinian player

By James M. Dorsey

Imprisoned Palestinian soccer player Mahmoud Sarsak has ended his 92-day hunger strike as part of an Israeli agreement to move him from a prison clinic to a civilian hospital and release him on July 10. The agreement was reached in what sources close to the deal described as a “tough negotiation” following stepped up pressure on Israel for his release.

It was not immediately clear what lasting damage Mr. Sarsak would suffer as a result of his hunger strike and whether he would eventually be able to play again. Sources close to the effort to achieve his release said they hoped that at the very least Mr. Sarsak would emerge as a symbol who would encourage youth to play soccer and give Palestinian players a sense of hope.

Equally unclear is whether the deal involves only Mr. Sarsak or also two other Palestinian players who were detained earlier this year but had not joined his hunger strike. The two players, in contrast to Mr. Sarsak who was held since 2009 in administrative detention without being charged or put on trial on suspicion of being a member of militant Gaza-based Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, have been accused of involvement in a shootout with Israeli security forces.

A 25-year old soccer player from the Gaza city of Refah, Mr. Sarsak together with Akram al-Rekhawi, an imprisoned diabetic, and Samer al-Barq refused to join hundreds of Palestinians in Israeli jail who ended their hunger strike on May 14 in demand of improved prison conditions because they were not included in an Egyptian-mediated deal. It was not clear whether Messrs. Al-Rekhawi and Al-Barq had also ended their hunger strike.

Israel last month agreed to improve conditions for Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the end to the hunger strike a pledge by militant Palestinian groups, including Islamic Jihad, to honor a ceasefire. As part of the Egyptian negotiated deal to more family visits, Israel promised to end solitary confinement and limit a controversial policy that allows it to imprison people for years without charge. Israel had hoped the deal would avert the threat of public protests. Messrs. Sarsak, Al-Rekhawi and Al-Barq dashed that hope with their protest. Israel feared that that Mr. Sarsak’s death in Israeli prison could spark demonstrations on the West Bank and Israel itself.

Ironically, it took reports that Mr. Sarsak’s health had significantly deteriorated to persuade the international soccer community to intervene on his behalf. But once it did despite internal political bickering, the community made clear to Israel that a solution to Mr. Sarsak’s situation needed to be found before it was too late.

FIFA vice president Prince Ali bin Al Hussein first raised Mr. Sarsak’s case on May 14, the day most Palestinian inmates ended their hunger strike, during a visit to the West Bank city of Ramallah to attend the Nakba soccer tournament. Pressure on Israel began to pile up early this month with a letter by world soccer body FIFA president Sepp Blatter to the Israeli Football Association (IFA), a statement by professional soccer player organization FIFpro, and private representations by European soccer body UEFA.

Palestinian Football Association head General Jibril Rajoub called in a letter that his aides said had been sent on June 12 to UEFA president Michel Patini for stripping Israel of the right to host the Euro 2013 Under-21 championship. It was not clear whether the letter had been received by Mr. Platini and whether the threat of losing the championship played a role in Israel’s decision to compromise.

The effort to achieve a solution involved various segments of the soccer community with Israel belonging to UEFA while Palestine is a member of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) as well as the Palestine Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.  “There was a big of finger pointing about who said what, but at the end everybody was talking about the issue and working to resolve it,” said a soccer executive close to the efforts to get Mr. Sarsak released who requested anonymity.

Middle Eastern soccer executives said it remained to be seen whether the international focus on Mr. Sarasak’s case would prove to be an isolated incident or whether it would increase attention for the problems of Palestinian players as a result of Israeli security measures. “It is important that elected football officials be true to the issues that affect the game. No doubt, the Sarsak case is only one such issue and most likely there are others not only in our part of the world,” one executive said.

In his June 12 letter to IFA president Avi Luzon, Mr. Blatter expressed concern that Mr. Sarsak and the two other Palestinian players, Olympic soccer team goalkeeper Omar Abu Rwayyes and Ahmad Khalil Ali Abu El-Asal, who plays for the Aqabat Jaber Palestinian refugee camp soccer team, were being “illegally” detained “in apparent violation of their integrity and human rights and without the apparent right of due process (trial).”

He called on the IFA “to act with the utmost urgency” given “the graveness of the … situation” to “draw the attention of the competent Israeli authorities to the present matter with the aim of ensuring the physical integrity of the concerned players as well as their right for due process.”

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, and a consultant to geopolitical consulting firm Wikistrat.

Syria: Saudi Arabia’s policy conundrum

RSIS presents the following commentary Syria: Saudi Arabia’s policy conundrum by  James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.).  Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 101/2012 dated 18 June 2012 Syria: Saudi Arabia’s policy conundrum By James M. Dorsey    Synopsis Saudi Arabia is faced with the succession of its ageing leadership following the death of Crown Prince Nayef at a time that the 89-year old King Abdullah is countering efforts by conservative clerics to employ the Syrian crisis as a vehicle to thwart his minimal reforms and circumvent post-9/11 restrictions on charitable donating, designed to prevent funds from flowing to jihadists. Commentary FOLLOWING THE death of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, barely a year after he was appointed heir to the throne, there is little doubt that the likely nomination of his brother, 76-year old Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz as the kingdom’s crown prince will prove to be smooth. Nevertheless, the death of Prince Nayef, who served as interior minister for more than three decades, could prompt the sons of the kingdom’s founder, King Abdul Aziz al Saud, to open the door to one of their sons moving into the line of succession to the throne. The succession issue in the oil rich kingdom that is home to Islam’s two most holy cities, Mecca and Medina,takes on added importance at a time that Saudi leaders are seeking  to ring fence their country against the region’s anti-autocratic protests and clamour for greater  freedom. That is proving increasingly difficult despite political and military crackdowns  and generous government handouts. Syria for one poses a conundrum for a policy that supports popular and armed opposition  to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in part by fueling sectarian strife in a country teetering  on the brink of civil war while at the same time trying to insulate the kingdom from the  region-wide challenge to autocratic rule. Establishment clerics preaching from Friday prayer pulpits as well as on social media denounce the Syrian regime as well as the Alawites, the heretic Shiite sect from which Assad hails, and support the Saudi and Qatari supply of arms through Turkey to armed elements of the Syrian opposition. The clerics, like the government, make no effort to square their support for regime  change in Syria and their earlier assistance in easing Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh out of  office with their crushing of a popular uprising in neighbouring Bahrain and the crackdown on  protests in Saudi Arabia’s predominantly Shiite Eastern province, home to much of the kingdom’s oil wealth. Wielding a stick and a carrot King Abdullah has sought to halt the wave of protests at Saudi Arabia’s frontiers by wielding both a stick and a carrot. The Saudi military as well as interior ministry forces under Prince Nayef’s leadership responded firmly to Shiite protests and have cracked down on bloggers and activists. At the same time, King Abdullah has sought to preempt dissent by allocating more than US $100 billion for enhanced services, handouts and the creation of jobs, primarily in the military and security forces, and cautiously moving ahead with snail pace reforms.  In a move designed to ensure government control of policy towards Syria, limit the fallout of  the Syrian crisis and tighten government control of the clergy, King Abdullah recently cracked down on independent support for   Assad’s opponents by conservative clerics. Salafi clerics, who were opportunistically supported by Prince Nayef, and advocate a society that emulates the very early days of Islam, were ordered late last month to halt   collecting donations in support of the Syrian opposition. That collection threatened to circumvent central government  control of all charitable donations to foreign causes introduced post 9/11. Once Saudi Arabia  realized that its charities had been infiltrated by jihadists, including members of Al Qaeda, it ordered a halt to prevent monies from flowing to militant Islamists who are bolstering the ranks of Syria’s armed opposition.  Salman al-Awda, a prominent cleric whose relationship with the government runs hot and cold, countered on Twitter that those who wished to independently fund the Syrian opposition would continue to find ways to do so. The government went a step further in early June with a ruling by the Council of Senior Ulema (religious scholars) that banned the calling for jihad in Syria outside of officially controlled channels. In doing so the government sought to prevent Syria from becoming a vehicle in the hand of opponents of King Abdullah for criticism of government policy and advocacy of far more radical change. King Abdullah’s crackdown constituted the second blow in a month to those clerics who  oppose reforms such as a relaxation of rules governing the public mixing of the sexes. Earlier  they were unable to stop King Abdullah from lifting a ban on young men visiting shopping malls. In a heavily gender-segregated society this allows Saudi youths to furtively glance at the  opposite sex and surreptitiously flash or exchange their mobile numbers or social media  identities. Some weeks before cracking down on radical support for Syria, King Abdullah fired a  popular cleric and scion of a commercial empire, Sheikh Abdel Mohsen Obeikan, who  served as an advisor to the royal court, for opposing the expansion of employment  opportunities for women in education, medicine and retail sales and badly needed judicial  reform. However the clerics have successfully blocked Saudi women for the first time from  competing as official representatives of their country in an international sports tournament,  at the London Olympics. A clamour for real change Women activists are testing the limits of the king’s reform willingness with a campaign to lift Prince Nayef’s prohibition of women driving. Some 600 Saudis petitioned King Abdullah last week to allow women to drive in the only country in the world where they are banned from doing so. Women driving has so far been a bridge too far for the king. Scores of women who defied the ban in the past year have been arrested and forced to sign pledges that they would not drive again.  King Abdullah appears to have for now largely insulated his kingdom from the kind of mass anti-government protests other Arab nations are experiencing. The brutality of the struggle in Syria serves as a cautionary tale for many. The calls for change in Saudi Arabia are nonetheless mushrooming, boosted not only by the resilience of the Syrians but also the emergence of Islamists as victors in elections in Tunisia and Egypt. Reformers are likely to see the death of Prince Nayef as opening the door to a successor like Prince Salman who may be more inclined to lead the kingdom, albeit cautiously, further down the road of reform. The question nonetheless is whether government largesse, crackdowns and minimal, piecemeal reforms will continue to be sufficient to stymie the growing clamour for real change. James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International  Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He has been a journalist  covering the Middle East for over 30 years. Click here for past commentaries. Find us on Facebook.  Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre. Please click  here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.

Dissident Syrian soccer player reflects protesters’ greater religiosity

By James M. Dorsey

A celebrated national soccer team goalkeeper, singer of revolutionary folk songs and cheerleader of the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the besieged city of Homs, in a sign of the protesters becoming more religious, is increasingly couching his public remarks in Islamic terms while at the same time seeking to keep the door open to minorities such as the Christians.

In a video dated April 13, Abdelbasset Saroot, who has been targeted by the regime on several occasions, called on Syrian mothers to prepare their sons for martyrdom in confronting the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on the 15-month popular revolt that has brought Syria to the brink of civil war.

“The clothes of the heroes are the shrouds of burial, the shrouds of the martyrs that every hero is searching for. I want to send a message to our mothers at home making Du’a (a Muslim religious invocation) for us: O mother, my shrouds are new, prepare a funeral procession for me for I have come to you as a martyr in my celebratory clothes, my new home is Jannah (paradise),” he chants to a packed square in Homs applauding him.

“O mother, prepare a funeral for me and be happy on my behalf and forgive me, O mother. O mother, my shrouds are new, O mother to a martyr. O mother, collect your tears, make me happy by smiling. My testament isn’t money or gold, my testament is that you are satisfied with me. Kiss my brother and sister goodbye… O mother, call my people and my children to walk the path of the martyrs,” Mr. Saroot continues.

The curly, black haired soccer player prefaces his call with an invocation of Allah designed to appeal to both Muslims and Christians. Calling on the crowd to raise their hands, he says: “I bear witness that there is no God worth worshipping but Allah and I bear witness that Mohammed is His servant and messenger and I bear witness that Jesus was a messenger of Allah. There is no God but Allah.” His words are repeated by the cheering crowd.

By referring to Jesus, Mr. Saroot, was despite his Muslim terminology reaching out to Syria’s Christian minority that alongside the Kurds and the Druze have remained on the side line of the revolt for fear that forcing Mr. Assad out of office would pave the way for an Islamic regime that would be less tolerant toward minorities – a fear the Assad regime has sought to cultivate.

Mr. Saroot asserted in a You Tube video last summer that the Assad regime had accused him of being a Salafi fundamentalist who seeks to turn Syria into a state that emulates life as it was in the time of the Prophet Mohammed.

“This accusation was made when we took to the streets, demanding freedom for the Syrian people. I am now wanted by the security agencies, which are trying to arrest me. I declare, in sound mind and of my own volition, that we, the free Syrian people, will not back down until our one and only demand is met: the toppling of the regime. We are not Salafis, and there is no truth to the regime's claims about armed groups or a Salafi emirate,” Mr. Saroot said at the time before the protests developed an armed wing.

In August of last year, Mr. Saroot reported on YouTube that Syrian security forces had arrested national soccer goalkeeper Mosab Balhous on charges of sheltering armed gangs and possessing suspicious amounts of money. Mr. Balhous has been missing since. He said Mr. Balhous too had been accused of participating in anti-government protests and wanting to establish an Islamic emirate in Homs, Syria’s third largest city that has become a focal point of anti-Assad protests.

Unconfirmed videos from Homs circulated this week purport to show heavy Syrian military bombardment of the city in recent days. The bombardment, coupled with massacres allegedly carried out by pro-Assad forces, and stepped up armed Syrian opposition attacks prompted United Nations ceasefire monitors in Syria to this weekend suspend their operations.

A 21-year old player for Syria's national Under-23 team, Mr. Saroot stands out in a region in revolt, in which soccer players feted by autocratic leaders and managers appointed by their regimes have remained largely on the side lines of mass anti-government protests. At the heart of their reluctance to join popular revolts is what Palestinian-American historian Hisham Sharabi called neo-patriarchy in a controversial 1992 book that is still banned in many Arab countries.

Mr. Sharabi argued that Arab society was built around the dominance of the Father (patriarch), the center around which the national as well as the natural family are organized. Between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is absolute will, mediated in both the society and the family by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion.

In other words, according to Mr. Sharabi's thesis, Arab regimes franchised repression so that in a cultural patrimonial society, the oppressed participated in their repression and denial of rights. The regime is in effect the father of all fathers at the top of the pyramid. As a result, the patriarchal values that dominate soccer in addition to its popularity made it the perfect game for neo-patriarchs. Their values were soccer's values: assertion of male superiority in most aspects of life, control or harnessing of female lust and a belief in a masculine God.

The identification of the deposed leaders Egypt, Yemen and Libya – Hosni Mubarak, Abdullah Ali Saleh and Moammar Qaddafi – as well as Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with their country’s national teams turned their successes and failures into barometers of how their regimes were faring. They also turned celebrated soccer players and managers into regime supporters who saw the autocrat as their father figure.

Syrian soccer is no exception to the rule and has as a result been increasingly polarized since last year’s eruption of anti-government protests. United Nations observers in Syria suspended their mission this week. They warned that the confrontation between Mr. Assad’s forces and armed segments of the opposition had produced a state of civil war in Syria and undermined efforts to establish a ceasefire.

Louay Chanko, a player for the Swedish national team, who was able to stop playing for it because he also played for Swedish Assyrian team Syrianska FC, said in an interview last month that many of the Syrian national squad’s players continued to play against their will. “Everything is corrupt. The SFF (Syrian Football Federation) just took players from the clubs. Many players didn’t want to play for the national team any more. Players are so afraid,” Mr. Chanko said.

The Assad regime was so desperate for a Syrian soccer success in a bid to shore up its wrecked image and demonstrate that the country was functioning normally that it went in the past year to great lengths to ensure that its national team would compete in international tournaments, including the fielding of illegal players. That prompted world soccer body FIFA to bar Syria last August from competing for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil after the team fielded an unnamed ineligible player in in a qualifying match against Tajikistan. Lebanon subsequently accused Syria of fielding six players in an Under-19 Asian Football Championship qualifier whose ages had been falsified to qualify them for the team.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, and a consultant to geopolitical consulting firm Wikistrat.