Five Seven Five Sports: 2012 in Haiku - Language of the Games

Sports attorney, author, poet and former Princeton University first baseman Andrew Hanson has authored a new book titled "Five Seven Five Sports : 2012 in Haiku - Language of the Games".  It's a remarkable read, with a collection of Hanson's haiku poetry chronicling sports during 2012.  Here are a few of my favorite poems from it:

* * *

January 30, 2012 

Cross-court pick, seal, roll,

So fundamentally sound,

Leading to lift-off:

The winged monster,

Half Blake Griffin, half griffin,

Soars like an eagle,

Meets Kendrick Perkins,

Toughest member of Thunder,

Arms and elbow up,

Blasts uncoachable,

Heavenly throw-down dunk from

Top of backboard square,

Sends Staples Center

Into murmurous frenzy,

Adds and-1 free throw.  

April 20, 2012 

Fenway Park's birthday:

Pure music to Boston's eyes - 

Rice to Yastrzemski;

Legends fill the field,

Catch first pitches, lead the toast,

And proclaim, "Play Ball!" - 

Red Sox and Yankees - 

100 years to the hour

Of Fenway's first day...

Big Papi measures

Sports' most famous barrier,

High above left field;

Thirty-seven feet

No match for his home run swat,

First ruled a double;

After players pause

Ump's spinning hand frees Ortiz,

And his trot resumes...

Green Monster absorbs 

Repko's catch and collision,

Passes test of time.

June 23, 2012 

Ten women playing - 

Professionals before fans - 

"IX" uniforms;

40 years later,

Title IX's daughters compete;

Lynx outscore the Sky.

July 2, 2012 

Baseball "Horse" contest - 

Degree of difficulty:

The Pittsburgh foul pole;

Jones yanks one down line,

Practically splitting target,

Hitting the high bar;

Next shot - higher arc;

Walker avoids a letter,

Tallies an "HR".

November 10, 2012 

Jarred by lineman's hip,

The ball and play float, at risk -

Johnny on the spot;

Manziel transitions,

His gaze returned to end zone,

Ball back in his hands;

Johnny Football-Swope,

A&M-arrival play -

Easy pitch and catch...

Slicing 'Bama's route,

Everett's wise 4th-quarter pick -

Go-ahead bid fails...

Set to receive punt,

'Bama enters neutral zone - 

Unbeaten no more.

 * * *

I strongly recommend picking up Five Seven Five Sports.  Makes a great gift, too.

Tactical retreat: Ultras absent from protests in Egypt and Turkey

By James M. Dorsey

Militant, highly politicized soccer fans who played key roles in the toppling of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, opposition to post-Mubarak military rule, and last month’s mass protests against Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan have been as organizations conspicuously absent from the dramatic scenes in Cairo with the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi and ongoing smaller scale protests in Istanbul.

While endorsing participation of their members in ongoing protests in both countries, violence-prone, militant soccer fans known as ultras in Egypt and Turkey have retreated to their traditional public stance that they are not political organizations but do not stop their followers from engaging politically. It is a position designed to minimize their vulnerability as groups and shield them from being politically buttonholed.

Egyptian ultras, one of the country’s largest civic groups, adopted that position on the eve of 18 days of mass protests in 2011 on Cairo’s Tahrir Square that forced Mubarak to resign after 30 years in office. At the same time, leaders privately encouraged their members to play the key role they did in the president’s overthrow.

The past week’s events in Egypt form a dilemma for the ultras whose members populate the full spectrum of politics in the country. The ultras have a deep-seated distrust of the military and the security forces who have re-emerged in full strength as a result of the anti-Morsi protests. By the same token, many ultras oppose Morsi because of his perceived attempt to undermine the goals of Egypt’s popular revolt and his failure to reform the security sector.

Like in Egypt, rival fan groups united in Turkey last month to protect protesters and add their voice to the opposition against Mr. Erdogan. But in contrast to the Egyptians, they publicly declared their united stand as organizations under the banner ‘Istanbul United.’

Nevertheless, the tactical retreat and renewed seemingly exclusive organizational focus on soccer of fan groups in Egypt and Turkey follows incidents in both countries ostensibly designed to intimidate the fans and curb their activism.

More than 70 militant supporters of crowned Cairo club Al Ahli SC were killed in February last year in a politically loaded soccer brawl in the Suez Canal city  of Port Said that many believe was an effort that got out of hand to punish the ultras for their opposition to and vicious clashes with the police. The ultras have since then staged Port Said-related protests and stormed stadiums because of a ban on spectators attending matches.

The Egyptian Football Association (EFA) this week cancelled the soccer season because of the post-Morsi political volatility. It had earlier suspended the league because of security concerns.  

Much like the Egyptian ultras, spokesmen for Carsi, the powerful, popular militant soccer support group of Istanbul’s Besiktas JK, say they are lying low since 20 of its members were charged with being part of an illegal organization in the wake of last month’s Gezi Park protests.

As a result, Carsi denies any relationship to nightly Hyde Park style gatherings in the Istanbul neighborhood of Besiktas’s Abbasaga Park, one of multiple such public forums being held across the city. Nonetheless, Carsi members dressed in their club's black and white often moderate the Abbasaga discussions and performances organized to discuss the future of the protest movement, exchange news and listen to music.

The charges against Carsi reflect Mr. Erdogan's attempts to criminalize the fans and the protesters in a bid to cater to a traditionalist and conservative base and distinguish himself from the more modernist façade of his Islamist rival, Fethullalh Gulen, a powerful, self-exiled, 76-year old imam with a strong popular and media base and influence in state institutions like the police and the judiciary.

Mr. Gulen, shared Mr. Erdogan's criticism of the protesters and blaming of international media but in contrast to the prime minister quickly backed away from denouncing them as vandals and foreign agents. Instead he urged his followers not to underestimate the grievance underlying the protests and to accept that his movement as well as the government had not done enough to resolve social problems. At the same time, he sought to drive a wedge between the protesters by praising the original peaceful environmentalists demonstrating against the cutting down of trees in Taksim's Gezi Park as opposed to violent protesters, a reference to the soccer fans.

Carsi’s decision to bide its time did not stop small groups of fans of rival clubs from joining a demonstration in late June by some 20,000 fans of Fenerbahce who were protesting against the allegedly politically motivated allegations of match fixing. The protest demanded the resignation of Mr. Erdogan and denounced Galatasary for its alleged involvement in one characteristic of the match-fixing scandal: a struggle for control of Fenerbahce, Turkish soccer soccer's most prized political asset, between Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gulen.

The protest came days after European soccer body UEFA banned Fenerbahce alongside rival Besiktas from competing in European championships as a result of match-fixing allegations. Both clubs are appealing the decision.

In contrast to a protest 24 hours earlier on Istanbul’s Taksim Square against Mr. Erdogan's haughtiness, grandiose urban plans for Istanbul and perceived attempts to Islamize Turkish society which confronted a large police force at the ready, security forces were nowhere to be seen during the Fenerbahce march down Bagdat Caddesi, the high-end shopping throughway on Istanbul's Asian side. A day earlier police armed with tear and pepper gas and backed up by a water cannon occupied Taksim and surrounded protesters seeking to enter the square.

Less visible was a second contrast between the two Istanbul protests: while Fenerbahce fans protested under their group and club’s banners Carsi as a group has refused in recent weeks to participate in regular demonstrations on Taksim square.

"The Gezi Park demonstrations have shown that rival soccer fans can work together. The demonstrations have put Erdogan on notice. But that's not all. They also send a message to Gulen," said one soccer fan.

James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg, and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Should College Athletes Be Paid?

This past April, Boston College hosted a debate between the University of Hartford's Allen Sack and myself titled "Should College Athletes Be Paid?"  This symposium was direct a follow-up to our participation in "Debate Club" where we submitted essays to US News outlining our opinions on this very issue.  Those essays, along with a few others, can be found here.

After a bit of work, I'm pleased to provide you with the entire video from that evening's presentation.

Egypt on the Brink: The Military’s Dilemma

RSIS presents the following commentary Egypt on the Brink: The Military’s Dilemma by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg   ________________________________________ No. 127/2013 dated 11 July 2013 Egypt on the Brink: The Military’s Dilemma By James M. Dorsey Synopsis Egypt’s deep state has reasserted itself with the removal of President Mohammed Morsi from office. Questions of legitimacy are likely to plague attempts to return stability to Egypt with some form of military-guided democracy. Commentary EVENTS IN Cairo presage a return to the situation under ousted President Hosni Mubarak that prompted millions of Egyptians to camp out on Cairo's Tahrir Square two years ago  until the military forced him to step down after 30 years in office. However little in the drama currently unfolding harks back to the demands put forward by the protesters in 2011: an end to the police state, greater political freedom, respect for human rights, an end to corruption, and justice and dignity. Egypt was seemingly united when Mubarak was ousted and the mass demonstrations were singularly directed at an autocratic president who hailed from the military. This time round, the Muslim Brotherhood’s mass protests against the removal of Mubarak’s successor, President Mohamed Morsi, complicates things for the military that sees itself as the guarantor of the state. The military has in recent days demonstrated that it has learnt lessons from its bungling of Egypt’s transition from autocracy to democracy in the 17 months that it ruled the country following Mubarak’s departure. Return of the deep state This time the generals are seeking to pull the strings from behind a military-appointed interim president, Adly Mahmoud Mansour, rather than taking the reins themselves. That effort is however already faltering with the rejection of Mansour’s candidate for interim prime minister, the liberal opposition leader Mohammed el Baradei, by the Salafist Nour Party, which initially supported the military in its putsch against Morsi’s presidency. Whatever ruling group  emerges from the current crisis will govern a deeply divided country in which one substantial segment – comprising the millions of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood - believes that the disruption of the democratic process was designed to exclude its  participation. That perception as well as the reaffirmation of the role of what Egyptians call the deep state - the military, the security forces, the judiciary and parts of the media – is likely to make a smooth consensual return to a democratic process difficult at best. It is reinforced by the military’s return to Mubarak-era repression with the arrest of hundreds of Muslim Brothers, the closing down of Islamist media and possible charges being levied against Morsi. This week’s death of 51 Muslim Brothers, demonstrating in front of the Republican Guards headquarters where Morsi is allegedly being held, creates a situation similar to the crisis last year after 74 soccer fans died in a politically-loaded brawl in the Suez Canal city of Port Said. In contrast to the current crisis, Egyptians then rallied in support of the militant soccer fans. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s call for an uprising against the military promises to escalate violence and a crackdown on the group. The military so far has shied away from symbolising the reinstatement of Mubarak-era practices by declaring martial law. The Brotherhood may however leave it with little choice. It sees the peaceful protests against the military intervention as a provocation of violence against the Muslim Brotherhood - as a way to garner international sympathy and convince Egyptians that their country is returning to autocracy rather than moving towards democratic transition. Succeeding in forcing the military to openly take control is unlikely to make the Brotherhood’s opponents more sympathetic to its cause. But it may convince parts of the fragile anti-Morsi coalition, united on little else than wanting the Brotherhood out of office, that by relying on the military, they simply jumped from the frying pan into the fire.   Whatever way it takes, the military is likely to see its image tarnished - much like it did after ruling the country during the transition from Mubarak to Morsi. The military has already suffered two setbacks in recent days: the thwarting of El Baradei’s appointment and the escalation caused by the deaths of the Muslim Brotherhood protesters. Getting legitimacy right At the heart of Egypt’s crisis is a mis-interpretation of what constitutes democratic legitimacy by both Morsi and his opponents as well as a military that is determined, whatever the cost, to protect its perks and privileges. Morsi failed to recognise that legitimacy is defined not only by electoral victory but also by recognition of that legitimacy by those who voted against him. The mass protests on Tahrir Square against him demonstrated that Morsi had lost that recognition. By the same token, legitimacy is hardly restored by military intervention and the suppression of a political grouping that enjoys the support of up to 25 percent of the population. The issue of legitimacy is likely to plague Egypt for some time to come. Even if the military and Mansour were able to steer Egypt towards speedy free and fair elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed - and agrees - to participate and a constitution that is more universally accepted than the one Morsi unilaterally adopted, the government that emerges from that poll will be perceived as one constrained  by the military’s political priorities. Restoring legitimacy and stability in Egypt will ultimately depend on Egyptians insisting that their differences are managed through dialogue rather than intervention, an abandonment of majoritarian concepts of democracy in favour of pluralism and inclusiveness, and a democratically-elected government that is capable of imposing its will on the military and the other components of Egypt’s omnipresent deep state. James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of  International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore,  co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg, and the  author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. ________________________________________ Click herefor past commentaries. Find us on Facebook. Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre. Please click hereto subscribe to the Centre's publications.

Military Coup in Egypt: A Recipe for Failure

RSIS presents the following commentary Military Coup in Egypt: A Recipe for Failure by James M. Dorsey. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg No. 126/2013 dated 9 July 2013 Military Coup in Egypt: A Recipe for Failure By James M. Dorsey Synopsis Egypt’s transition from autocracy to democracy has been waylaid by the two forces that threatened it from the outset: a military determined to retain its power behind the scenes and a Muslim Brotherhood that sought power  despite being ill-prepared for office. The ousting of President Mohammed Morsi will further complicate Egypt’s transition, change the dynamics of Islamist politics, and trigger broader repercussions across the Middle East and North Africa. Commentary EGYPT IS back to square one, with the military grabbing centre stage again through a coup in all but name. This came just two-and-a-half years after mass protests toppled President Hosni Mubarak in a popular uprising that rejected a security-dominated autocracy and the military’s behind-the-scenes central role in politics. The military owes its return and the prospect of regaining ts key role in Egyptian politics to the missteps of ousted President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government – the very force with whom it was at odds for the past six decades. Morsi came to office after more than a year of transitory military rule that the armed forces bungled with its inept, post-revolt attempts to preserve as much as possible the old autocratic system and its perks and privileges: control of national security; an independent relationship with the United States that funds it to the tune of  US$1.3 billion a year; rejection of civilian oversight and autonomy for its commercial empire that accounts for at least ten percent of Egypt’s gross national product. Legitimacy versus endorsement History will remember Morsi less as Egypt’s first post-revolt, democratically-elected president than as a failed leader who thwarted the achievements of the popular uprising’s goals and strengthened by default the military’s grip on politics, while presiding over an economy that was already in stark decline following the revolt that overthrew Mubarak. He also severely tarnished Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s support for Islamists across the Middle East and North Africa, and demonstrated that the Brotherhood, despite being one of the world’s largest and best organised Islamist movements, has a long way to go before it is ready for government. Morsi’s failure is much the result of opposition and resistance by key state institutions – the military, the security forces, and the judiciary – to the rise of the Brotherhood. Morsi’s decision to run for office, contrasting starkly with the Brotherhood’s initial reluctance to join the anti-Mubarak uprising, broke its early promises not to seek a post-revolt majority in parliament or field a candidate for president. Morsi’s insistence to the bitter end that he was a legitimately-elected leader reflected the same majoritarian interpretation of democracy displayed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his response last month to mass protests. Both Morsi and Erdogan’s failure to adopt inclusive policies alienated a significant portion of the population. But unlike Erdogan, Morsi failed to realise that he had lost the second ingredient of legitimacy alongside electoral victory: a recognition by those that had not voted for him that he was the country’s elected leader. Far-reaching consequences Morsi’s political demise has far-reaching consequences for Egypt as well as the Middle East and North Africa: The military will remain a key force free of civilian control and with a significant political and economic power base even if newly-appointed President Adly Mansour moves immediately towards free and fair elections. The reinstatement of Mubarak’s attorney general, the rounding up of hundreds of Muslim Bothers in the wake of the coup, and the prosecutor’s investigation of Morsi on charges of ‘insulting the presidency’ suggest that the military sees its intervention as an opportunity to shape Egypt in its mould. It raises the question of the role of the military in future anti-autocratic struggles in the Middle East and North Africa. As Egypt ventures into uncharted waters, the military would do well to look towards Southeast Asia where retired military officers in countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar successfully managed their countries’ transition to democracy. Those officers understood that their interests were best protected by getting in front of the cart rather than seeking to salvage what they could of a failed system that lacked popular support. That is a recognition that has yet to be accepted by Egypt’s armed forces as well as other Arab militaries. The coup reinforces a widespread sentiment among Islamists that, in the words of Morsi’s national security advisor Essam al-Haddad, “democracy is not for Muslims.” It risks the radicalisation of Islamists across the region who may see the ousting of Morsi as evidence that the Brotherhood’s strategy of working within the system is doomed to failure. There is little short of releasing detained Brothers, lifting the ban on Islamist media and immediate free and fair elections in which the Brotherhood will be allowed to compete unhindered that will counter the Islamists’ sense of disenfranchisement. That sense of disenfranchisement is reinforced by the repression of the Brothers by Egypt’s three previous presidents – Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Mubarak; the 1991 abortion of Algerian elections to prevent the victorious Islamists from taking office, thus sparking a brutal civil war; the soft coup against Turkish Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in the late 1990s; and the Western boycott of Gaza following the electoral triumph of Hamas. The intervention of the military strengthens Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Qatar for influence in the region. Saudi Arabia, backed by the United Arab Emirates, cemented its regional predominance by assuring the Egyptian military that it would step in if the United States cut off its US$1.3 billion annual aid to the armed forces or if Qatar, the Brotherhood’s main backer, reduced its $5 billion support to the government during Morsi’s tenure. The intervention was Qatar’s second regional setback as the country seeks to stamp its own influence in the Middle East. Similarly the supply by Saudi Arabia of non-US surface-to-air missiles to Syrian rebels – endorsed by the US - was from the kingdom’s perspective designed to strength the resistance to President Bashar al-Assad as well as to weaken the Brotherhood’s Syrian wing supported by Qatar. The Egyptian military intervention constitutes a watershed that is fraught with danger and likely to reverberate throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The absence of a reformist wing in Arab militaries comparable to those in Southeast Asia will complicate the region’s transition from autocracy to a more open, transparent and accountable polity. James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture of the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Click here for past commentaries. Find us on Facebook. Due to the high number of publications by our RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), RSIS maintains a separate subscription facility for the Centre. Please click  here to subscribe to the Centre's publications.

Wrongful Death and Vicarious Liability connecting to Aaron Hernandez

I have a new article for SI.com on potential liability for Aaron Hernandez, the Patriots and the NFL stemming from the murder case. 

Death, taxes, and Dwight Howard

Blog Emperor Paul Caron points out that although the Lakers offered Dwight Howard more money, the combination of Texas not having state income tax and California's top marginal tax rate of 13.3 % means he likely will take more money with the Houston deal.

Sports and patriotism

From ESPN's Howard Bryant. I'm not sure this is as new a phenomenon as he suggests or that sports used to be apolitical, but I agree that it has become more pervasive and, to some, obnoxious.  I particularly like the closing paragraph, where he points out the inconsistency (if not outright hypocrisy) of leagues and the media immersing games in compulsory politics, then criticizing players who speak out for their own causes and ideals, demanding that they "shut up and play."

Given Media Frenzy, Can Aaron Hernandez Receive a Fair Trial?

I have a new article for SI on the impact of the media coverage on Aaron Hernandez receiving a fair trial, as well as whether he might face multiple trials.

NCAA Sanctions against Oregon: Much Ado About Nothing

The sanctions handed down to Oregon this week are unlikely to have any practical impact. Oregon was accused of paying a recruiter, Willie Lyles, $25,000 to funnel a recruit to the school.  After failing to agree on a proper punishment through the NCAA’s summary disposition process, the prevailing sentiment was that the Committee on Infractions (COI) would punish the Ducks harshly, most likely with a bowl ban of at least one year.  That was not the case.  The school faces no bowl ban, which generally accompanies major sanctions (See, Ohio State, Penn State, USC, and countless others).  Other penalties were equally insignificant.  The reduction of one scholarship per year is unlikely to yield significant detrimental effects.  The reduction in official visits from 56 to 37, accompanied with other various recruiting restrictions, will make the task a bit more challenging for the coaching staff, but overall, will not impede a program of this magnitude.  The harshest sanction, the 18-month show cause penalty against former Head Coach Chip Kelly, also has no real impact since Kelly now coaches in the NFL, and is unlikely to return to college during that 18-month period. 

A number of explanations for the decision could be at play here.  One factor is that the NCAA’s recruiting regulations have undergone significant change in the last few years (See generally, NCAA Bylaw 13); it may simply be that the facts of this case were just not that nefarious based on emerging sentiment and rule changes.  Another ancillary consideration that the COI likely took into account is that the student-athlete in question never played for Oregon.  Perhaps the COI was actually reluctant to issue harsh sanctions due to the constant and biting criticism NCAA Enforcement has faced as a result of the Miami investigation, and other public relations missteps. 

One take way from this decision, however, is that the NCAA does not look favorably upon lying to investigators, and it will punish teams and individuals accordingly.  It appears that Oregon was frank with investigators, and admitted to paying Mr. Lyles the $25,000 fee.  Whereas, at USC and Ohio State, key administrators and coaches attempted to conceal key facts, resulting in much more draconian sanctions (Penn State is a different matter entirely).  Also, while there is no way to know for certain, it is interesting to theorize what would have happened if Kelly was still coaching at Oregon.  As it is, the team got off light, and he received the harshest sanction.  Would that have been reversed if he was still the sitting coach?  Perhaps.  Similarly, would the COI have issued a show cause penalty of significant length to an active head coach?  Its difficult to say.  It appears that Kelly’s penalty further serves as an example of the NCAA’s distaste for dishonesty:  Kelly received an 18-month show cause penalty for paying money to an unscrupulous recruiter, but was honest about it after the fact; Bruce Pearl, former Head Basketball Coach at Tennessee, hosted a barbeque for prospective-student athletes at his home, a seemingly harmless offense, yet he lied about the event and was issued a three-year show cause order.  Ultimately, there is no way to accurately predict how the COI will rule in these cases, but the best advice that can be given is that when the Association arrives on campus, the truth should not be concealed. 

Hat tip to Brian Konkel for his work on this piece.